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Most U.S. businesses are family owned, and yet the law governing business 
organizations does not account adequately for family relationships. Nor have 
legal scholars paid sufficient attention to family businesses. Instead, legal 
scholars operate within a contractarian model of business organization law, 
which holds that a firm is comprised of a nexus of contracts among 
economically rational actors. Intimate relationships appear irrelevant except 
insofar as they affect contractual choices. Indeed, strictly speaking, there is no 
such thing as family-business law. 
This Article lays the foundation for a law of family business by expanding the 
contractarian model: a firm includes not just business contracts, but all 
bargains among participants that affect the business enterprise. The payoff for 
including family considerations is twofold. First, when family obligations 
introduce uncertainty, such as when co-owners of a business divorce, contract 
offers an explanatory resource for resolving disputes consistent with the 
parties’ expectations. Second, a contractual conception of the firm can guide 
the establishment of appropriate default rules for the interpretation and 
enforcement of family-business bargains. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most U.S. businesses are family owned,1 and yet the law governing 
business organizations does not account adequately for family relationships.2 
Nor have legal scholars paid sufficient attention to family businesses.3 Instead, 
legal scholars operate within a contractarian model of business organization 
law, which holds that a firm is comprised of a nexus of contracts among 
                                                                                                                       
 1  See DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 274 (2d ed. 
2008) (“Family dominated businesses comprise more than 80 percent of U.S. enterprises, 
employ more than 50 percent of the nation’s workforce, and account for the bulk . . . of 
America’s gross domestic product.”); Joseph H. Astrachan & Melissa Carey Shanker, 
Family Businesses’ Contribution to the U.S. Economy: A Closer Look, 16 FAM. BUS. REV. 
211, 217–18 (2003) (“No matter what criteria are used, family businesses represent a 
substantial portion of the U.S. economy and have a massive impact on the economy as a 
whole.”). This Article defines family business broadly to include businesses in which 
effective control rests in family hands and at least two family members are involved as 
owners or managers. For further analysis, see infra Part III.A. 
 2  First, “[a]s a legal matter, the corporation is an entity wholly separate from the 
people who own it and work for it.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 7 (2002). Further, shareholders are presumed to seek their own economic 
advantage. See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A 
Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 220 (1992) (“Rational individuals invest 
their human and money capital with a view to maximizing the value of such resources.”); 
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). 
 3  See Eric A. Chiappinelli, Stories from Camp Automotive: Communicating the 
Importance of Family Dynamics to Corporate Law Students, 34 GA. L. REV. 699, 710 (2000) 
(observing that “corporate law casebooks are astonishingly devoid of any systematic 
consideration of family dynamics”). In a recent article, I explored the underlying values that 
often motivate family-business owners. See Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family 
Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2013); see also Steven H. Hobbs & Fay 
Wilson Hobbs, Family Businesses and the Business of Families: A Consideration of the Role 
of the Lawyer, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 153, 158 (1998) (identifying distinctive social and 
cultural dimensions of family businesses). This Article examines the legal implications of 
family relationships, making a more direct case for the salience of family-business law. 
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economically rational actors.4 Intimate relationships appear irrelevant except 
insofar as they affect contractual choices.5 Indeed, strictly speaking, there is no 
such thing as family-business law.6 
Nevertheless, family relationships have a habit of intruding on business 
matters. For instance, if a married couple owns a corporation, either spouse can 
petition for divorce, triggering an equitable division of assets overseen by a 
family court judge who is not bound by the existing allocation of stock between 
the spouses. In a “no-fault” divorce proceeding, it is irrelevant whether the 
petitioning spouse could have sought corporate dissolution by alleging 
shareholder oppression, let alone demonstrated an ownership stake that would 
have provided the spouse standing to assert such a claim.7 Whether the issue is 
divorce, inheritance, or the operation of a family trust that owns business assets, 
family law can have a considerable influence on business law outcomes.8  
Further, the supposed irrelevance of family relationships does not follow 
from the premise that business organizations are defined by contract. A central 
purpose of contracting is to empower individuals to order their own affairs.9 In 
a family business, the members’ relationships are multifaceted in ways that 
impact business-planning choices. Through private ordering, family-business 
                                                                                                                       
 4  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 26 (“[I]t is fair to say that the economic theory of 
the firm is now the dominant paradigm in corporate law.”) (citing William T. Allen, 
Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1399 
(1993)); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (arguing 
that the firm is “a framework of contractual relations”). 
 5  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 229 (1991) (noting that “[t]he continuous and nonpecuniary nature of these 
relationships reduces agency problems”). 
 6  Perhaps because family business disputes often fall within the equitable jurisdiction 
of family court, the bulk of legal scholarship concerning family businesses does not engage 
broader theories of corporate law and is produced by practitioners in the context of 
continuing legal education programs. See, e.g., William M. Long & Scott A. Sissel, Divorce 
and the Family Business—What are the Options?, 9 BUS. ENTITIES 30, 30 (2007); John J. 
Scroggin, Factor Estate Planning Considerations into Divorce Arrangements, 70 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 23, 23 (2003); Myron E. Sildon, Dealing with Divorce and Non-Traditional 
Relationships in the Family Business, A.L.I.-A.B.A. EST. PLAN. COURSE MATERIALS J., Feb. 
2010, at 39. 
 7  A petition for corporate dissolution, by contrast, is more akin to a divorce based on 
fault. See John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority 
Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 691 (2007) (“[B]ecause 
there is no concept of no-fault divorce (or even irreconcilable differences) for business 
dissolutions, the mud of mistreatment allegations must be slung, and litigants (and courts) 
must muddle through the quagmire.”). 
 8  For purposes of the argument advanced in this Article, estate planning falls within 
the broad domain of family law because it concerns the transfer of family wealth across 
generations. 
 9  Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 99, 100 (1989) (“[F]reedom of contract requires that parties to the ‘nexus of contracts’ 
must be allowed to structure their relations as they desire.”). 
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members can manage the intersections of business law and family law. For 
instance, because families involve the transfer of resources across generations, 
family businesses are often structured to achieve estate planning and related tax 
objectives; trusts, wills, and other testamentary documents may be as 
constitutive of the business as articles of incorporation, bylaws, and shareholder 
agreements.10 Likewise, because divorce can seriously disrupt a family 
business, married couples may use nuptial agreements to specify whether 
business assets count for purposes of equitable division in the event of 
divorce.11 
This Article lays the foundation for a law of family business by expanding 
the contractarian model: a firm includes not just business contracts, but all 
bargains among participants that affect the business enterprise. Like businesses, 
families are a locus of economic activity and members must negotiate questions 
of production, distribution, and exchange.12 In a family business, therefore, the 
background economic concerns of family life are central, not ancillary, to the 
structure of the business and the parties’ mutual expectations.13 As extensions 
of family life, family businesses are defined by broader economic goals and 
more intimate associations.  
The payoff for placing family considerations within the contractual 
conception of the firm is twofold. First, when family obligations introduce 
uncertainty, such as when co-owners of a business divorce, contract offers an 
explanatory resource for resolving disputes consistent with the parties’ 
expectations.14 Family members’ agreements regarding business and family 
                                                                                                                       
 10  See infra Part III.C. 
 11  See UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(c), 9C U.L.A. 22–23 
(2012). 
 12  See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 241 (2005) (“Many 
households . . . build commercial activity directly into their daily operations.”). Professor 
Zelizer contends that “commercial relationships do not simply transect and influence 
household relationships; they become household relationships.” Id.; see also Jill Elaine 
Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 493 (2005) (arguing 
that “[e]conomic exchange is not foreign to intimate relations, either as a matter of first 
principles or as a positive matter of legal regulation”). 
 13  Families are regulated by law but subject to further contractual agreements among 
members. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (1998) (“Like relational contracts in commercial contexts, a marital 
contract contemplates a long-term commitment to pursue shared goals, the fulfillment of 
which will enhance the joint welfare of the parties.”); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of 
Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (contending that private ordering has 
increasingly “supplanted state-imposed rules and structures for governing family-related 
behavior”);  see also Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New 
Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 208 (1982). 
 14  Family objectives are not necessarily what a rational actor would formulate and 
appreciating them may “force us to reckon with the role of far less rational emotions—
particularly, love—in guiding the familial structures . . . .”  Ariela R. Dubler, All Unhappy 
Families: Tales of Old Age, Rational Actors, and the Disordered Life, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
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matters interrelate and should not be read in isolation.15 For example, if 
corporate assets are at issue in a divorce, the enforceability of a prenuptial 
agreement specifying what counts as marital property may be as crucial to the 
business as any shareholder agreement.  
Second, a contractual conception of the firm can guide the establishment of 
appropriate default rules for the interpretation and enforcement of family-
business bargains. Contract is more than just a tool for interpreting and 
synthesizing explicit bargains in particular cases. Honoring the parties’ 
intentions can be difficult because the communal aspects of family life color 
individual choices and the self-interest attributed to a rational actor does not 
always provide a reliable guide to intentions.16 Moreover, family members may 
not have addressed key issues in advance because actual bargaining can 
undermine trust.17 Properly informed, contract law could serve as a resource for 
the parties, generating a set of preferred outcomes and facilitating more 
particular bargaining.18 By overlaying simultaneously relevant business and 
family considerations, a contractual approach makes it possible to appreciate 
what is at stake in a family business.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II traces the emergence of the nexus-
of-contracts theory of the economic firm, emphasizing that the nature of the 
firm depends upon the contracts that bind its participants. Part III shows that 
family businesses have distinctive characteristics, both because family values 
influence business choices, and because the laws governing divorce, 
inheritance, and trusts can produce results at odds with what business 
organization laws would otherwise dictate. Part IV argues that contracts 
encompass the parties’ business and family obligations and, therefore, can 
account for the distinctive characteristics of family businesses. Part V contends 
                                                                                                                       
2289, 2292 (2013) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A 
HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012)). 
 15  See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 894 (2000) 
(arguing for a conception of “connected contracts” in which the boundaries of a firm are 
constantly undermined by “a fluid, nonlinear, nonhierarchical set of interactions and 
interrelationships”). 
 16  See DAVID BORK, FAMILY BUSINESS, RISKY BUSINESS: HOW TO MAKE IT WORK 26 
(1986) (arguing that “what is going on in the individual [is] inseparable from the family 
network of relationships in which the individual is embedded [and from] the emotional 
processes in that system . . . .”); see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–93 (1989) 
(exploring the role of courts in defining contractual obligations in the absence of explicit 
terms based on assumptions regarding the parties’ intentions). 
 17  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805–06 (2001) (noting that 
parties may avoid explicit bargains in order to preserve trust). 
 18  See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its 
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1045 n.52 (2004) (“The tendency of parties to accede to 
default rules in order to avoid the cost of contracting around them renders them ‘sticky[.]’”) 
(citing Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1591, 1598 (1999)). 
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that conceptualizing family businesses in terms of a contractual nexus would 
also guide the design of default rules and interpretive principles sensitive to the 
parties’ business and family expectations. 
II. THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS: A REVIEW 
Most business law scholars accept some version of the proposition that a 
“corporation is not a thing, but rather a web of explicit and implicit contracts 
establishing rights and obligations . . . .”19 As Part II.A shows, economists first 
developed the nexus-of-contract theory to explain how rational actors use firms 
to avoid transaction costs that can inhibit market exchanges.20 Part II.B 
describes the nexus theory’s rapid, if selective, acceptance by legal academics. 
Centrally, this Part contends that the conception of the firm as a set of 
contractual arrangements provides no a priori reason for excluding family 
bargains. 
A. An Economic Theory of the Firm 
In order to understand the nature of firms and their boundaries, it may help 
to begin with a more basic question: why are there firms?21 Firms acquire 
capital, use that capital to produce goods or services, and seek to sell those 
goods and services for more than the cost of production.22 Until relatively 
recently, most economists took firms for granted, treating them as little more 
                                                                                                                       
 19  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 8; see also Allen, supra note 4, at 1400 (“[T]he 
corporation is seen as the market writ small, a web of ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) 
between various real persons.”). Even critics of the nexus framework concede that many 
aspects of corporate governance are (and should be) modifiable. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (1989). More recently, 
one legal scholar has advanced an alternative, institutional argument that “firms have a 
social ontological existence because they are artificial fictions that are legally reinforced in 
the real world.”  ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 16 
(2013). However, while the theory treats firms as more than the sum of their contractual 
arrangements, it gives significant weight to the “bottom-up authority of participants.”  Id. 
 20  Note that “[i]n economics, the concept comparable to the corporation is that of the 
firm . . . .”  Gulati et al., supra note 15, at 890. 
 21  “If the competitive equilibrium of the neoclassical model actually [existed], there 
would be no need for other economic organizations.” PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, 
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 73 (1992). 
 22  See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 14 (1st ed. 1990) (“A firm allocates resources that it has purchased in order 
to produce and sell valued product; it earns the difference between what it receives as 
revenue and what it spends for the resources.”); George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets 
and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 106 (2009) (“Every company . . . accepts capital 
inputs . . . and uses this cash to purchase physical or intangible assets . . . . The company 
then deploys these assets against a business model in the pursuit of incremental value.”). 
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than a “black box” that transforms inputs into outputs.23 Yet, as long as 
individuals can contract with one another to exchange goods and services at 
mutually agreed prices in an undistorted market, no further organizing 
mechanism is needed.24 
Centrally planned allocations of resources are more expensive and, 
therefore, less efficient as a means of coordinating economic activity.25  For 
instance, when a business decides to make items in-house rather than buying 
them from an external source, the lack of competitive pressure may lead to a 
decline in quality.26  Other costs arise as firm owners compensate for the 
absence of a reliable market check of value, including the need to monitor the 
performance of employee agents,27 and the sheer cost of creating and 
maintaining the hierarchical structure of the firm.28  The problem, then, is to 
explain the phenomenon of firms without rejecting either the price mechanism 
as a means of allocating scarce societal resources or the assumption that 
individuals will rationally pursue the course of action best calculated to 
maximize their wealth.29 
                                                                                                                       
 23  See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 389 (1937) (noting a 
“gap in economic theory between the assumption . . . that resources are allocated by means 
of the price mechanism and the assumption . . . that this allocation is dependent on the 
entrepreneur[]”). 
 24  Id. at 387 (“An economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by 
the price mechanism . . . .”). Although some economists argue that firms became necessary 
as the complexity and scale of industry required a greater division of labor, Coase points out 
that the price mechanism applies with equal force regardless of the level of complexity. Id. 
at 398 (“It is perhaps the main achievement of economic science that it has shown that there 
is no reason to suppose that specialisation must lead to chaos.”); see also Butler, supra note 
9, at 103 (“In theory, all possible gains from specialization could be realized through market 
coordination in the absence of transaction costs . . . .”). 
 25  See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 
524 (1945) (arguing that market prices contain information and send signals that lead to 
more rapid and accurate allocations of resources than could be replicated by even the wisest 
central planner). 
 26  See Geis, supra note 22, at 107 (“Essentially, the argument is that sourcing any 
given activity internally shields production from the pressures of the marketplace . . . .”); 
Coase, supra note 23, at 389 (“[T]he distinguishing mark of the firm is the suppression of 
the price mechanism.”). 
 27  See Geis, supra note 22, at 112 (“[A]gency costs offer another reason to avoid 
centralizing economic activity within a firm.”). 
 28  See id. at 108 (noting that “[a]nyone who has tried to navigate the shoals of a large 
corporate bureaucracy” will understand the costs of coordinating internal activity); KENNETH 
J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 25 (1974) (noting that a firm’s “internal 
organization is . . . hierarchical and bureaucratic”). 
 29  See Coase, supra note 23, at 390 (“Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm 
emerges at all in a specialised exchange economy.”). One could avoid the horns of the 
dilemma by offering instead a political rationale for firms, focused on the power of the 
managerial class, or some other consideration, rather than expecting market efficiency. 
MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 21, at 73 (“Political organizations might still arise as 
people attempt to capture larger shares of the benefits of joint production or to bring more 
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As a corrective lens, it turns out that a single additional concept—
transaction cost—makes possible a straightforward, economic explanation for 
the existence of firms. In work for which he later received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics, Ronald Coase hypothesized that organizing production through 
firms is sometimes cheaper than relying upon open-market contracts.30 That is 
because, in the real world, the contracts that govern performance must be 
negotiated, written, monitored, and, if necessary, enforced.31 In longer-term 
relationships that do not involve a discrete exchange of goods and services, it 
becomes quite difficult to negotiate all issues satisfactorily and there remains a 
considerable risk that market actors will exploit power and information 
disparities to their advantage.32 When transaction costs are significant, rational 
market actors may decline to enter into trades that would generate value for all 
participants. 
For rational actors, the goal is to minimize all costs. Therefore, if 
transaction costs burden market transactions, it may be cheaper to organize 
production within a firm instead.33 A crucial implication of Coase’s work is that 
the solution to contract problems that can make markets inefficient is, well, 
contracts.34 For example, an entrepreneur can use employment contracts to 
establish a right to direct the manner in which work is performed.35 Although 
the relationship between employer and employee is hierarchical,36 it is defined 
by the employment contract; the employer has “no power of fiat, no authority, 
                                                                                                                       
concern for equity into the system, but organizations aimed at improving economic 
efficiency would be unnecessary.”). 
 30  Coase, supra note 23, at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a 
firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”). 
 31  Id. at 390–91. 
 32  Geis, supra note 22, at 110 (noting that transaction-cost theories of the firm “share[] 
the common insight that aggregating production into one legal entity can protect against the 
hold-up problem inherent with relation-specific assets”). An asset is relationship-specific if it 
would command a much lower price, once developed, if sold elsewhere. The danger is that 
the purchaser will exploit its advantage, capturing most of the value of the exchange. See id. 
at 108–09. Long-term contracts can address the problem. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. 
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 559–62 (2003). 
It is difficult, however, to anticipate “every variety of opportunistic renegotiation.”  Geis, 
supra note 22, at 109. 
 33  See Butler, supra note 9, at 103 (“[O]nce transactions costs are added, the least 
costly, or most efficient, form of coordination of certain economic activities may be through 
the firm.”). 
 34  Cf. The Simpsons, Homer vs. The Eighteenth Amendment (Fox Network television 
broadcast, Mar. 16, 1997), available at https://youtube.com/watch?v=PdFoAr5QdwA (“To 
alcohol! The cause of—and solution to—all of life’s problems.”). 
 35  This form of contracting may be cheaper, from a transaction-cost perspective, 
because the owner “does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom 
he is co-operating within the firm . . . .”  Coase, supra note 23, at 391. 
 36  See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) 
(“Within the firm individual bargains between the various cooperating factors of production 
are eliminated and for a market transaction is substituted an administrative decision.”). 
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no disciplinary” power beyond what would be available through “ordinary 
market contracting.”37 According to this view, the firm is just a label that stands 
for the set of contracts that organize economic production.38 
Because the firm is the aggregate of a set of contractual relationships, its 
boundaries are loosely defined. Contracts exist inside and outside the firm and 
pertain to the same economic substance—the development and sale of goods 
and services. Thus, whether a particular contractual relationship falls within or 
crosses over the boundaries of the firm requires functional analysis.39 There is 
no categorical difference.40 What we see when we open up the black box is 
identical to what we find outside the black box: contracts among various parties 
organizing the factors of production.41 
Moreover, economic firms share much in common with other types of 
organizations. In each case, laws provide a core structure of mostly default 
principles around which voluntary relationships concatenate: 
 It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal 
fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals. This includes firms, non-profit institutions such as universities, 
                                                                                                                       
 37  Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972). Alchian and Demsetz argue 
that firms arise when production can be done most efficiently through a team effort, in which 
individual contributions are difficult to separate and, thus, costly to coordinate through open-
market contracts. Id. at 779. For a related theory of corporate law, see Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250–51 
(1999). 
 38  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 311 (“The private corporation or firm is simply 
one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships . . . .”). 
According to the nexus theory, “[c]ontractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only 
with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc.”  Id. at 310. 
 39  Id. at 311 (“Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those 
things which are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are 
‘outside’ of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., 
contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital 
inputs and the consumers of output.”). 
 40  For instance, the various arrangements among firms can include joint operations, 
shared marketing, subcontracting, and other complex relational ties. See Geis, supra note 22, 
at 101–02 (describing hybrid outsourcing arrangements); G.B. Richardson, The 
Organisation of Industry, 82 ECON. J. 883, 884 (1972), reprinted in THE THEORY OF THE 
FIRM: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 16 (Nicolai J. Foss ed., 
2000) (“So complex and ramified are these arrangements, indeed, that the skills of a 
genealogist rather than an economist might often seem appropriate for their 
disentanglement.”). 
 41  See, e.g., JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 58 
(1990) (“[T]he make-or-buy decisions that occasioned so much debate in mass-production 
firms struck [managers] at Toyota as largely irrelevant, as they began to consider obtaining 
components for cars and trucks. The real question was how the assembler and the suppliers 
could work smoothly together to reduce costs and improve quality, whatever formal, legal 
relationship they might have.”). 
684 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:4 
 
hospitals and foundations, mutual organizations such as mutual savings banks 
and insurance companies and co-operatives, some private clubs, and even 
governmental bodies such as cities, states, and the Federal government, 
government enterprises such as TVA, the Post Office, transit systems, etc. 42 
As Jensen and Meckling recognized, the pressures that motivate 
cooperation within firms are not unique, nor are the governance choices found 
in firms radically distinct from those employed in other ventures calculated to 
achieve shared purposes.43 
Finally, the nexus-of-contracts conception of the firm includes agreements 
that may fail to contain the basic legal elements of a contract, namely offer, 
acceptance, and consideration.44 Economic contracts include, more broadly, 
“compacts among people, who recognize their mutual interests and agree to 
modify their behavior in ways that are mutually beneficial.”45 Such agreements 
are considered contractual in this broader sense “regardless of whether they 
have the legal status of contracts.”46 By focusing on the functional role of 
contract, rather than the formal indicia that lawyers use to separate enforceable 
from unenforceable agreements, economists can extend contractual analysis to 
explain the structure of a wide variety of voluntary human associations.47 
B. Corporate Law’s Economic Structure 
Before the advent of law and economics, the prevailing theory of corporate 
law characterized the corporation as a legal person authorized and defined by 
the state, operated by private individuals only as a concession from the state, 
and subject to extensive regulation.48 Although deemed a legal person, the 
                                                                                                                       
 42  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 310. 
 43  See id.; see also Saul Levmore, Competition and Cooperation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
216, 219–20 (1998) (suggesting a possible analogy between the boundaries of cooperation in 
a family and a firm). 
 44  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (stating that “the 
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent 
to the exchange and a consideration”). 
 45  MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 21, at 127; see also John H. Langbein, The 
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) (“The bedrock 
elements of contract are consensual formation and consensual terms.”). 
 46  MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 21, at 127. 
 47  See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 20 (2007) (stating that one measure of the credibility of a social science 
hypothesis is whether it has “excess explanatory power” with “implications that are novel, 
counterintuitive, and as different from the original explanandum as possible”). 
 48  Butler, supra note 9, at 100 (noting that “[t]he entity theory of the corporation 
supports state intervention ”). On the other hand, “[t]he contractual theory of the corporation 
is in stark contrast to the legal concept of the corporation as an entity created by the state.”  
Id. 
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metaphysical characteristics of the corporation remained uncertain.49 In a 
famous article, Professor Felix Cohen ridiculed “as transcendental nonsense” 
the notion that one could, for example, sensibly ask where a corporation is 
located.50 A jurisprudence that takes such “supernatural” concepts seriously 
becomes an empty, “autonomous system of legal concepts, rules, and 
arguments.”51 Corporate law, Cohen argued, does not stand apart from “ethics 
and . . . such positive sciences as economics or psychology.”52 
Whatever the limitations of the underlying corporation-as-person metaphor, 
most corporate law scholarship focused on practical concerns regarding the 
managerial power resulting from the separation of ownership and control in 
large public corporations.53 Deeper reflections on the nature of the corporation, 
let alone theories of economic firms in general, were an afterthought until, 
borrowing from Jensen and Meckling’s work in economics,54 legal academics 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s reframed the debate in corporate law.55 The 
                                                                                                                       
 49  See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1482, 1489 (1989). 
 50  See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1935) (“Clearly the question of where a corporation is, when it 
incorporates in one state and has agents transacting corporate business in another state, is not 
a question that can be answered by empirical observation.”Rather, continued Cohen, it is “a 
question identical in metaphysical status with the question scholastic theologians are 
supposed to have argued at great length, ‘How many angels can stand on the point of a 
needle?’”) 
 51  Cohen, supra note 50, at 821. Cohen argued that scholars should replace the “ghost-
world of supernatural legal entities” with “legal concepts as patterns of judicial behavior, 
behavior which affects human lives for better or worse and is therefore subject to moral 
criticism.”  Id. at 828–29. 
 52  Id. at 821. However, a rejection of formalist conceptions of corporate law does not 
require acceptance of the legal realist project or, more broadly, the claim that law is a branch 
of social science. See, e.g., Joseph Vining, The Resilience of Law, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 151, 154–55 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009) 
(objecting that the influence of social science on law has often been reductive, offering 
unwarranted simplicity and failing to account for law’s authoritative dimension). According 
to Professor Vining, “authority and therefore . . . law[ ]runs straight up to a transcendent 
dimension of the universe.”  Id. at 167 (emphasis added). 
 53  See Bratton, supra note 49, at 1486; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 (1932). 
 54  See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of 
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1984); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the 
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 930 (1983); 
Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property 
Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1330 (1979). 
 55  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: 
The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1820–21 
(1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 
YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261–62 (1982); Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common 
Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 808–11 (1987). 
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signature work encapsulating the law and economics contribution remains 
Frank H. Easterbrook’s and Daniel R. Fischel’s The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law.56 
According to the economic account of corporate law, a firm “is a legal 
fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contractual relationships among 
individual factors of production.”57 The background rules are also contractual, 
because, whether or not bargained for explicitly, “[a]ll the terms in corporate 
governance are contractual in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions 
among the interested parties.”58 In this regard, the parties’ choice of business 
entity form is part of the contract.59 If there are provisions that most investors 
would want, it is more efficient to provide those terms in advance through a 
standard form, while permitting those with more idiosyncratic needs to modify 
the agreement.60 The resulting legal structure of the firm, including the 
centralization of management, represents “the cost-saving devices of transacting 
parties.”61   
The new corporate law theory’s debt to transaction-cost economics should 
be apparent.62 However, as translated into legal academic discourse, the 
economic theory of firms usually addresses a more specific quandary—the 
nature of the business corporation—a subset of economic firms.63 Also, unlike 
                                                                                                                       
 56  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5. For a survey of contemporary work in 
corporate law and economics, see generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). 
 57  Bratton, supra note 49, at 1471; see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989); Steven N.S. Cheung, The 
Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1983). 
 58  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 17. Thus, “the firms that pick the wrong 
terms will fail in competition with other firms competing for capital. It is unimportant that 
they may not be ‘negotiated’ . . . .” Id. 
 59  See Butler, supra note 9, at 105 (“The theory of the firm helps explain not only why 
certain activities are organized through firms rather than markets, but also the particular type 
of firm organization utilized under different circumstances.”). According to Easterbrook and 
Fischel, “corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in 
corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting.”  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 
5, at 34. 
 60  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 34 (arguing that corporate law, in its 
ideal form, “supplements but never displaces actual bargains, save in situations of third-party 
effects”). 
 61  Bratton, supra note 49, at 1482. 
 62  See id. at 1471 (“Law and economics writers restated corporate law in the new 
theory’s terms and successfully reoriented legal discourse on corporations.” (footnote 
omitted)). A more detailed account would further distinguish agency theory, transaction-cost 
economics, and property-rights theory, see, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, 
Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 261, 264–71 (2001), but this Article’s claims do not require exploration of each 
permutation of the Coaseian insight. 
 63  See Bratton, supra note 49, at 1471 n.1 (“Economic theories of the firm concern all 
producing units, no matter how organized. Legal theories of the firm, in contrast, tend to 
focus on the corporation.”). Contemporary analysis would include the LLC and perhaps 
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their economist forerunners, legal academics have not necessarily accepted that 
the boundaries of a firm depend upon the content of its contracts and, 
ultimately, are arbitrary.64 
Despite those departures from the economist’s version of the nexus theory, 
its implications for corporate law have been liberating. As one scholar 
summarizes, 
 The nexus-of-contracts approach . . . produces three important and related 
insights about corporate law. The first is that shareholders’ rights and duties 
are (or should be) defined by contract. The second is that corporate law should 
be “enabling” rather than mandatory. The third is that no particular set of 
outcomes is best for all firms. Rather, each firm must find the specific set of 
contractual obligations that best suits its shareholders.65 
To the extent family members who co-own a business have distinctive 
expectations, it would seem to follow that contracts would allow them to 
conform the firm to those expectations. Part III offers an affirmative argument 
to that effect. 
At this stage, though, it will suffice to underscore two points. First, the 
contractual framework envisions that firms should be designed to suit the needs 
of shareholders, rather than the other way around. Second, the distinctions 
between internal, corporate contracts and other contractual arrangements that 
advance the firm’s business are not always amenable to categorical line 
drawing.66 Accordingly, there is no justification for excluding family 
                                                                                                                       
other types of unincorporated business entities. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE 
UNCORPORATION 178–79 (2010). 
 64  See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
621, 671–72 (2004) (characterizing as “contractarian nihilism” the logic “that leads to the 
conclusion that organizations have no boundaries”). From a legal standpoint, it is the entity 
status of the firm that enables it to hold property separately from its owners. Id. at 632–33 
(arguing that “[a]sset partitioning . . . represents an important difference between 
organizational forms and simple contractual arrangements”) (citing George G. Triantis, 
Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and 
Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1104–06 
(2004)). However, if the focus is instead on the internal, contractual governance of the firm, 
then it may not be relevant whether in their external function firms also have a “proprietary 
or in rem dimension that complements their internal contractarian or in personam features.”  
Id. at 633. 
 65  Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to 
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
1266, 1269 (1999). 
 66  See Oliver E. Williamson, Intellectual Foundations: The Need for a Broader View, 
33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 210, 214 (1983) (noting the absence of a sharp distinction given the 
shared use of contract to organize relations). For instance, in one case, a corporation 
abandoned a contemplated merger when too many shareholders indicated that they would 
dissent from the transaction and seek to have their shares appraised; instead, the corporation 
entered into a series of long-term supply contracts with its former merger partner designed to 
achieve the same substantive result but without giving shareholders a voice in the matter. 
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arrangements by fiat—to rely on formal, doctrinal distinctions between business 
law and family law is to traffic in the kind of legal formalism that law and 
economics means to replace. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the ultimate success of the 
nexus of contracts as a theory of corporate law.67  Arguably, the economic turn 
in corporate law scholarship replaces the self-referential, enclosed universe of 
formalistic jurisprudence with an equally self-referential and enclosed universe 
based on a simplified economic model of human behavior.68  However, 
whatever its limitations, the economic framework has been enormously 
influential, both in its conceptual clarity and its far-reaching normative 
implications.69 
This Article proceeds, therefore, on the assumption that contract offers a 
useful way of thinking about the formation and governance of business entities. 
An argument for legal rules focused on the distinctive characteristics of family-
owned businesses could be advanced as well under alternative conceptions of 
business organizations that emphasize their political and social dimensions,70 
                                                                                                                       
See Good v. Lackawanna Leather Co., 233 A.2d 201, 204–05 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1967). 
 67  In earlier work, I criticized strong versions of contractarian reasoning to the extent 
that they fail to recognize the vulnerable status of minority investors in closely held firms 
who are often unable to protect themselves via contract. See, e.g., Benjamin Means, A 
Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1163–
64 (2010) [hereinafter Means, A Contractual Approach]; Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based 
Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close 
Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1214–15 (2009) [hereinafter Means, A Voice-Based 
Framework]. Others have been more pointed in their criticisms of the nexus framework. See 
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of 
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2011) (reviewing RIBSTEIN, supra note 
63). 
 68  See, e.g., Vining, supra note 52, at 159 (arguing that the law and economics 
conception of the corporation is impoverished because it assumes that the only purpose of a 
corporation is long-term profit maximization for shareholders). Taking a different tact, 
Professor Pierre Schlag argues that “the concept of transaction costs does not have the sort 
of theoretical intelligibility and operational applicability necessary to make the market-based 
transaction cost approach plausible.”  Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1664 (1989); see Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the 
Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 967–70 (1988); see also 
Means, A Contractual Approach, supra note 67, at 1171–72. 
 69  See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 760 (1995) (summarizing descriptive and normative claims relating to 
the nexus of contracts). Professor Klausner contends, in particular, that the standard 
contractarian account should appreciate that “corporate contracts” interrelate. Id. at 761. 
 70  See, e.g., Brian M. McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 509, 528 (2011) (arguing “that the corporate form is, and throughout its history has been 
understood to be, an imperfect community”). 
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identify team-specific commitments made by a variety of stakeholders,71 or 
otherwise take a broader view of the role of businesses in society.72 Indeed, the 
significance of family business might be easier to defend under some of these 
alternative views. As the next Part shows, however, any conception of the 
family-owned firm that ignores family law will misapprehend the parties’ actual 
obligations in a wide set of circumstances. 
III. FAMILY LAW’S INFLUENCE 
In family businesses, the implications of family law are inescapable. This 
Part argues that family law’s influence runs through the essential questions of 
business organization law: who the members are, what obligations they owe to 
one another, and how the assets of the firm will be controlled and distributed. 
Part III.A offers a general definition of family business and contends that 
difficulties of application in particular cases only underscore the importance of 
identifying central, recurring issues. Part III.B shows how family law and 
business law principles overlap in businesses co-owned by married couples, 
especially when business assets must be divided. Part III.C identifies conflicting 
business and family governance rules and fiduciary obligations that arise when 
family ownership is intermediated through trusts. Finally, Part III.D explores 
the extent to which family business entities may be driven by tax 
considerations, including opportunities for income splitting among family 
members and for reducing estate taxes. Taken together, these examples set up 
Part IV’s argument for a contractual approach to family businesses by 
demonstrating that family businesses already contain family law and business 
law elements but lack a general framework for integrating those elements when 
they conflict. 
A. Defining the Inquiry 
In order to evaluate the significance of family law for family businesses, 
logic would suggest that we must first clarify the meaning of family business—
thereby providing a stable referent for analysis.73 To this end, we might begin 
                                                                                                                       
 71  See Blair & Stout, supra note 37, at 250; LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE 
PUBLIC 74 (2012). 
 72  See, e.g., Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Corporate Social Responsibility After 
Disaster, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2012); Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the 
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129, 129 (2009); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The 
Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2004); Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility: Dangerous 
and Harmful, Though Maybe Not Irrelevant, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1227, 1227–30 (1999); 
Peter Nobel, Social Responsibility of Corporations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1999). 
 73  See ELSTER, supra note 47, at 15 (emphasizing that the first, and “easily 
overlooked” step in social science explanation is “to establish that the fact is a fact”). 
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with a simple requirement that effective control of the business rests in family 
hands and that at least two family members be involved as owners or 
managers.74 In finance and management literature, other definitions variously 
require an intention to maintain family ownership over time,75 the involvement 
of more than a single generation of family owners, or high-level managerial 
involvement.76 
However, any broad definition involves simplification and may be difficult 
to apply in particular cases. For instance, what is the proper characterization of 
a business formed by a married couple that divorces but continues to work 
together?77 Or surviving spouses who share no connection other than the sibling 
bond of their deceased partners? Or a business founded by unrelated individuals 
whose children later fall in love and marry? In these cases, and others that might 
be imagined, family connections exist but are difficult to define.78 It is even 
possible to create a family relationship to satisfy a business requirement, rather 
than the other way around.79  
                                                                                                                       
 74  See Danny Miller & Isabelle Le Breton-Miller, Challenge Versus Advantage in 
Family Business, STRATEGIC ORG., Feb. 2003, at 127 (stating requirement that “a family has 
enough ownership to determine the composition of the board, where the CEO and at least 
one other top executive is a family member, and where the intent is to pass the firm on to the 
next generation”); see also Means, supra note 3, at 1205. 
 75  Miller & Le Breton-Miller, supra note 74, at 127. 
 76  Id. 
 77  See Long & Sissel, supra note 6, at 35 (“Often the only thing divorcing spouses can 
agree on is that the family business should not be sold at the time of the divorce.”). Joint 
ownership may persist “if the business would not currently generate an acceptable purchase 
price, where the spouses would not retain their positions with the company after sale, where 
opening a competing business is not practical, or where the spouses’ children rely on their 
current employment with the family business.”  Id. 
 78  Professor Susan Kuo deserves thanks for posing a few of these hypothetical 
challenges. 
 79  See Vikas Mehrotra et al., Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family 
Firms, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 840, 841 (2013) (examining “two unique practices of Japanese 
business families: marriages arranged to inject talent into business families and adoptions of 
promising adults as principal heirs”). In a recent novel, one author described a historical 
antecedent of the contemporary phenomenon: 
 
“To speak with sincerity,” says Ogawa, “my blood ancestors is not here: I was borned 
at Tosa Domain, on Shikoku, which is big island”—Ogawa points east—“that way, to 
father of low retainer of Lord Yamanouchi of Tosa. Lord gave my schooling and sent 
me in Nagasaki for learn Dutch under Ogawa Mimasaku’s house to make bridge 
between his Tosa and Dejima. But then old Lord Yamanouchi died. His son has no 
interest in Dutch studies. So I was ‘marooned,’ you say? But then Ogawa Mimasaku’s 
two sons died in cholera, ten years ago. Much, much death in city that year. So Ogawa 
Mimasaku adopted me, to continue family name . . . . I had new name, new life, new 
father, new mother, new ancestors.” 
 
DAVID MITCHELL, THE THOUSAND AUTUMNS OF JACOB DE ZOET: A NOVEL 86 (2010). 
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Also, differences in business scale may require further diversification of the 
family-business model. For example, in a small, family-owned entity, the 
external consequences of a business dispute may be limited to the family 
relationships among owners.80 In larger organizations, destabilizing family 
disputes affect hundreds of employees and may even have civic implications. 
To cite one case in point, the Los Angeles Dodgers organization was thrown 
into turmoil when the owner’s divorce created uncertainty about who would 
gain control of the team, while the sheer cost of the divorce allegedly siphoned 
away funds needed to sustain operations.81 A more detailed typology could also 
distinguish vertical and horizontal family ties, designate the generation of 
family ownership, and account for other significant ethnic or religious 
affiliations.82 
 In sum, any single definition of family business will struggle to account for 
a wide variety of family and business contexts. Even worse, the leading 
indication of whether a business should qualify as a family business for 
purposes of this Article’s analysis may be whether family law affects it. (From 
an internal perspective, the equivalent proposition would be that a family 
business is just a business in which the participants believe that they are in a 
family business).83 As a formal matter, this borders on tautology: A is B 
whenever B is A. 
                                                                                                                       
 80  See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983) (involving a dispute 
over ownership of family-owned close corporations). 
 81  When the Dodgers’ owner, Frank McCourt, sought refuge in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, the Commissioner of Major League Baseball filed papers indicating the 
possibility of terminating the franchise. See Lester Munson, The ‘Death Penalty’ and the 
Dodgers, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2011), http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/ 
munson-110930/mlb-shows-powerful-hand-dodgers-dispute, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
U95D-RMUJ (“Paying his personal expenses with Dodgers money, baseball says, prevents 
McCourt from ‘acquiring new players,’ meeting ‘future payroll obligations’ and ‘improving 
the Dodgers fan experience.’”). The Dodgers case is also discussed infra Parts III.B.2, 
IV.C.1. 
 82  See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 
2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (asserting corporation’s right to free exercise of 
religion based upon the family owners’ religious beliefs); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (same); see also Matthew I. Hall & Benjamin Means, The 
Prudential Third-Party Standing of Family-Owned Corporations, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 151, 154–55 (2014), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-
Online-151.pdf (identifying distinctive aspects of family ownership). 
 83  See Means, supra note 3, at 1206 (“[F]or purposes of this Article’s focus on family 
business governance, what matters is not so much a formal definition of family but whether 
the business participants understand themselves to be members of a family.”). As one 
scholar observes, “[a] century ago, ‘family’ was culturally confined to persons related by 
marriage and blood; today, family is defined by relations of affinity, love, and commitment.”  
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, 
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1883 (2012). 
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Two responses are in order. First, the utility of a contractual approach to 
coordinating relationships does not presuppose perfect distinctions between 
legal categories, so long as the parties are able to anticipate legal obligations 
and adjust those obligations through contract. It is of no practical import to the 
parties whether they, or their legal advisors, could establish two boxes— one 
for family businesses and one for non-family businesses— and reliably assign 
businesses to one of the two boxes.84 Indeed, aspects of family law might be 
dealt with contractually in firms that are not, by any stretch, family businesses. 
For instance, a hedge fund could require its partners to have premarital 
agreements in place to protect the business from the consequences of divorce.85 
In other words, the lack of a fully specified “family business” category may 
reinforce the importance of contractual flexibility. 
Second, the difficulties in determining, on a case-by-case basis, how to 
categorize businesses are no impediment to the study of recurring challenges 
involving the combination of business and family interests.86 Perhaps most 
significant, “[f]amily businesses present distinctive challenges because they 
combine the values and expectations of the workplace with more intimate 
family bonds.” 87 When parents and children are also coworkers, connections 
rooted in family life must be adjusted to meet the obligations of the 
workplace.88 Thus, operating a family business can be difficult because it 
destabilizes the social roles that help individuals “categorize themselves and 
others as a means of ordering the social environment and locating themselves 
and others within it.”89 For instance, family business participants must decide 
whether to prioritize family obligations—by employing family members or 
                                                                                                                       
 84  See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1055 
(2002) (arguing that law’s preoccupation with fixed categories is more a matter of aesthetic 
preference than underlying reality: “In the grid aesthetic, law is framed as a field, a territory, 
a two-dimensional space that can be mapped and charted.”). 
 85  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not an unheard of phenomenon. Without 
advance planning, a shareholder’s divorce may affect the interests of other shareholders by 
introducing a new, possibly unwelcome participant. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. 
Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 271–74 (Alaska 1980) (involving a claim of minority shareholder 
oppression brought by a plaintiff who received her interest in the corporation in a divorce 
from her husband, one of the co-founders). 
 86  See, e.g., MANFRED F.R. KETS DE VRIES ET AL., FAMILY BUSINESS ON THE COUCH: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (2007) (“[I]n a business family, normal family goals may 
come into conflict with the business’s economic goals because an important theme within 
the family system is to meet the human and psychological needs of its members rather than 
to arrive at the best economic return.”). 
 87  Means, supra note 3, at 1207; see AMY SCHUMAN ET AL., FAMILY BUSINESS AS 
PARADOX 2 (2010) (stating that family businesses “have a longer time horizon than most 
non-family firms, as they view the business as crucial to perpetuating the family into future 
generations”). 
 88  See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 25 (1995). 
 89  BLAKE E. ASHFORTH, ROLE TRANSITIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE: AN IDENTITY-
BASED PERSPECTIVE 24 (2001). If “social roles are incompatible, family business has a built-
in conflict.”  Means, supra note 3, at 1209. 
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otherwise distributing resources based on need—or whether to insist upon 
market tests of value. Moreover, as discussed in the sections that follow, the 
laws applicable to family relationships and business relationships also reflect 
different values and overlap in the family-business context. 
B. Household Economics 
A family business is, among other things, an extension of family 
relationships. For married couples, two problems can arise. First, can the 
business assets be distinguished from the broader economic life of a household? 
Second, in the event of divorce, to what extent do equitable principles of family 
law control the distribution of business assets? 
1. Spousal Contributions 
In a marriage that involves an equal sharing of economic resources, it may 
not appear necessary to define a spouse’s role in a business entity owned by the 
other spouse. Yet, especially in smaller, unincorporated businesses, the nature 
of the business can turn on the characterization of spousal contributions.90 No 
bright-line test will do, however, as the sharing of control, profits, and losses 
that define a business partnership also describe a marriage, and a spouse’s 
involvement in a business might not fit neatly into either category.91 According 
to a leading treatise, “[t]he exercise of control by a spouse may be simply that 
of a helpmate in marriage rather than that of a partner; one spouse may share 
proceeds of the business in order to satisfy a support obligation.”92 Thus, 
                                                                                                                       
 90  If only one spouse has an ownership stake, the business enterprise may not count as 
a family business at all. Otherwise, the definition of family business would depend upon the 
marital status of the founder. Also, most people, married or not, have significant family ties, 
but, without more, those attachments cannot convert every sole proprietorship into a family 
business. 
 91  See Larry E. Ribstein, Incorporating the Hendricksons, 35 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 
273, 296 (2011) (“Although the relationship may seem to have the usual partnership indicia 
of control and profit-sharing, these may actually be domestic arrangements.”). Some 
feminist legal scholars cite unpaid labor in family business to ground “critiques of the 
market/family dichotomy, including the portrayal of market actors as self-sufficient 
individuals.”  Lisa Philipps, Helping Out in the Family Firm: The Legal Treatment of 
Unpaid Market Labor, 23 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 65, 66 (2008). 
 92  ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 2.10 (2d 
ed. 2014); see also LaRoque v. LaHood, 613 A.2d 1033, 1042 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) 
(holding that the fact both spouses “made management decisions for the business” did not, 
by itself, demonstrate the existence of a partnership); Cleland v. Thirion, 268 A.D.2d 842, 
844 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (refusing to recognize partnership, despite the parties’ apparent 
agreement, because “plaintiff’s name was never placed on a certificate of doing business as 
partners, no partnership tax returns were ever filed and there never was any sharing of profits 
or losses”). 
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disputes concerning alleged business partnerships turn on conceptions of 
business, family, and the appropriate relations between the two. 
Consider, as an illustration, a family farm bankruptcy case in which each 
spouse sought to withhold $7,500 in farming equipment under an exemption for 
“tools of the trade.”93 The bankruptcy trustee challenged the wife’s claimed 
exemption on two grounds: either the farm equipment was solely owned by the 
husband, consistent with tax records listing the farm as a sole proprietorship in 
his name; or, in the alternative, the farm had been operated as a partnership, in 
which case the personal equipment exemption was inapplicable. Accepting this 
logic, the bankruptcy court rejected the claimed exemption.94 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that both spouses could claim the 
exemption because the trustee had not met its burden of showing either a lack of 
ownership or the existence of partnership. Regarding the issue of joint 
ownership, the court noted that although Kansas does not treat all property 
within a marriage as community property,95 there was both testimony and 
evidence that the farm had been operated jointly.96 Also, “[a]ll proceeds from 
the farming operation were placed in a joint account, and funds to pay for the 
equipment came out of this account.”97 Both spouses signed the relevant loan 
documents in acquiring the farm equipment.98 
However, the satisfactory resolution of the ownership issue threatened to 
confirm the disqualifying existence of a partnership, which is formed whenever 
two or more persons co-own a business for profit.99 The prima facie case for 
partnership looked strong, as it was alleged by the debtors that they “co-owned 
the farm equipment, jointly participated in the work, and shared the profits.”100 
Yet, the court further observed that the “usual indicia of a partnership are 
blurred by the marital relationship.”101 For instance, “[t]he co-owning of 
property, sharing of profits, and the apparent authority for one spouse to act on 
behalf of the other are all common to the marital relationship even absent a 
                                                                                                                       
 93  In re Lampe, 331 F.3d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Debtors Donald and Shelia 
Lampe are husband and wife farmers who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.”). 
 94  See In re Lampe, 278 B.R. 205, 208 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002) (citing and reversing 
unpublished bankruptcy court order that had concluded Mrs. Lampe lacked a separate 
“ownership interest” and, therefore, could not assert the tools-of-the-trade exemption). 
 95  See Alvin E. Evans, Primary Sources of Acquisition of Community Property, 10 
CALIF. L. REV. 271, 271 (1922) (“Whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband 
and wife shall be their community property.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 96  In re Lampe, 331 F.3d at 756 (“Shelia Lampe worked on the farm and operated all 
equipment except the planter and combine.”). 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. (“Shelia Lampe co-signed on the notes and security agreements to obtain 
operating loans for which the farm equipment served as collateral.”). 
 99  Specifically, under Kansas law, “the association of two or more persons to carry on 
as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to 
form a partnership.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-202 (West 1998). 
 100  In re Lampe, 331 F.3d at 757. 
 101  Id. 
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business.”102 The “indicia” of partnership overlap with those of marriage, and 
the trustee could not sustain its burden of establishing the existence of a 
partnership separate from the marriage itself.103 Thus, because of the family 
relationship, it was possible to conceive of the farm as occupying a space 
between the sole-proprietorship and the general partnership, an unrecognized 
hybrid in which shared ownership is defined more by marriage than by business 
agreement. 
Definitional disputes involving households and business ventures can arise 
even in more formally established business entities. For example, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina concluded, in a divorce proceeding involving the 
ownership of a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise, that the husband’s ownership 
claim could be sustained as a contract claim based on a preexisting partnership 
even though it would not have merit under the North Carolina business law, 
which requires shareholder agreements to be in writing.104 The intermediate 
appellate court, by contrast, had held that “any agreement [between] the 
husband and wife for the husband to join her in the business was not 
enforceable under contract law because [it was] not supported by valuable 
consideration, since plaintiff’s interest in the business evolved from his status as 
a husband, and not as a business partner.”105 Thus, a broadly contractual view 
of the parties’ relationship supplanted a status-based view of marriage, on the 
one hand, and a formalistic application of corporate law, on the other.106 
Likewise, another court held that the distribution restrictions in an 
antenuptial agreement did not preclude the wife from asserting a 50% 
partnership interest in a business enterprise that had grown “from approximately 
                                                                                                                       
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. (“Although the Lampes deposited profits in a joint account, no evidence 
suggested this arrangement was required by an agreement to share profits as partners rather 
than the voluntary co-mingling of funds as spouses.”). Accordingly, “[a]bsent a showing of 
some other indicia of a partnership beyond those incident to the marital relationship, the 
Trustee has not met its burden of proving a partnership existed, and Shelia Lampe therefore 
is entitled to claim the ‘tools of the trade’ exemption.”  Id. 
 104  Penley v. Penley, 332 S.E.2d 51, 64 (N.C. 1985) (“Plaintiff has properly chosen an 
alternate legal theory, premised primarily on defendant’s oral agreement to convey an 
interest in the corporation—a question of simple contract law. Accordingly, we do not view 
the parties’ agreement as an unenforceable shareholders’ agreement.”). 
 105  Id. at 56 (summarizing Penley v. Penley, 310 S.E.2d 360 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)). 
According to the wife’s testimony, there was no separate business agreement: “‘[A]s far as 
him owning the franchise, he didn’t own it. He knew he didn’t own it, and it never was his. 
But being married to somebody, you more or less take him as a partner. I didn’t take him as 
a partner in 1968 when he went to work over there; we were partners in marriage.’”  Penley, 
310 S.E.2d at 363. 
 106  See Penley, 332 S.E.2d at 62 (holding that “the jury could find that plaintiff 
reasonably premised his decision to render services on a full-time basis on promises made to 
him by defendant-wife, which led plaintiff to reasonably conclude and expect that his 
contributions would be rewarded by sharing in the business equally”). Although the jury 
could instead have found “that plaintiff joined the business . . . solely because he was the 
husband of an ill wife, the jury was not required as a matter of law to so find.”  Id. at 61. 
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$430,000 at the date of marriage to over $12 million at the date of the 
dissolution judgment.”107 Under the antenuptial agreement, she was entitled to 
the home equity, $6,000, the family car, and household furniture.108 However, 
she alleged successfully that she was a partner in the family business. Although 
she did not receive salary, after the marriage she “began working full time in 
[the] husband’s business.”109 As her role in the company expanded, she acted as 
“the head of the office when [the husband] was away on business” and the 
“business name registration” was later updated to reflect that the company was 
“a proprietorship of husband and wife.”110   
The court concluded that the wife’s waiver of interest in the husband’s 
property “does not preclude wife from asserting an interest in the company by 
virtue of her partnership with husband, but rather only precludes her from 
asserting an interest in husband’s undivided one-half interest by virtue of the 
marriage.”111 Thus, because of the overlap of business law and family law, a 
claim to ownership that might have been waived by a marital agreement was 
sustained under an alternate theory of business partnership. In each of the cases 
discussed so far, the question of business ownership is complicated because the 
economic partnership of marriage coexists with any separate business 
arrangements that the parties may have made.  
2. Double-Exit Dilemmas 
The impact of divorce law on family businesses co-owned by married 
couples further illustrates the entanglement of family law and business law. Not 
only must the parties exit the marital relationship, but also their separation will 
also in most cases involve the exit of one or both parties from the co-owned 
business. Just as a practical matter, the simultaneous winding up of two 
different legal entities creates problems of coordination.112 Further, the parties’ 
rights are not identical in each context and equitable principles of divorce law 
often trump conflicting corporate law rules. 
In a corporation, for instance, it is fundamental that the allocation of 
residual profits is determined by stock ownership.113 Equally fundamental, the 
                                                                                                                       
 107  In re Marriage of Leathers, 779 P.2d 619, 621 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
 108  See id. at 620. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. at 621. 
 111  Id. at 623. 
 112  See Brandon Southward, Double Trouble: When Spouses Who Share a Business Call 
It Quits, FORTUNE (Apr. 9, 2014, 10:28 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/09/double-trouble-
when-spouses-who-share-a-business-call-it-quits/, archived at http://perma.cc/6Q3N-6Y8M. 
 113  See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 13.01 (2d ed. 2003) 
(“A share of stock is primarily a profit-sharing contract, a unit of interest in the corporation 
based on a contribution to the corporate capital.”). 
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corporation is a legal person independent of any of its shareholders.114 Thus, 
unlike a general partnership, a corporation cannot be dissolved by the express 
will of a shareholder. In order to exit the investment, a shareholder has to find a 
willing purchaser.115 A family-owned business is subject to the same corporate-
law rules as any other business.116 
Yet, when family business assets are at issue in a divorce proceeding, a 
narrow focus on corporate law rules can be misleading.117 Once a petition for 
divorce invests a family law court with jurisdiction, the court has broad, 
equitable discretion to identify and divide marital assets.118 In a recent case 
involving the Los Angeles Dodgers, for instance, Jamie McCourt did not own 
any stock but was able to claim 50% in her divorce from Frank McCourt, the 
team’s sole owner.119 Despite her role as chief executive to the Dodgers before 
the divorce, and her unofficial designation as the team’s co-owner, she would 
not otherwise have had any legal claim to ownership. Yet, regardless of who 
owns the stock, the principle of equal division that governs exit from a marriage 
can dictate the terms of a business separation.120   
Divorce law may crowd out corporate law, even if the parties have 
negotiated a shareholder agreement with tailored dispute-resolution provisions. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently held in Colclasure v. 
                                                                                                                       
 114  See id. § 1.02 (“A business corporation is a legal device for carrying on a business 
enterprise for profit, a legal unit with a status or capacity of its own separate from the 
shareholders or members who own it.”). 
 115  See Lee,  supra note 72, at 153; Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 1701 (1996). In closely held corporations, the absence of a 
secondary trading market effectively locks in shareholder investments. A minority 
shareholder may petition for corporate dissolution (or to compel a stock buy out) but will 
succeed only if the shareholder can establish oppression or, in other words, fault. The nature 
of the oppression claim varies across jurisdictions as corporate law is mostly a matter of 
state law. 
 116  Analogous principles apply in LLCs. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & 
the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 928 (2005). 
 117  The same caution applies in cases involving partnerships or other forms of business 
organization. See, e.g., Bobrow v. Bobrow, No. 29D01-0003-DR-166, 2002 WL 32001420, 
at *20 (Ind. Super. Sept. 20, 2002) (“Courts across the country agree with Indiana that a 
partnership agreement that governs the distribution of assets among partners upon 
withdrawal from the partnership cannot and does not control what constitutes ‘property’ 
under state law for purposes of marital dissolution.”). 
 118  See EDWIN T. HOOD ET AL., CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES IN ESTATE PLANNING 
§ 8.10[G] (2d ed. 1998). Indeed, a spouse who held no stock and did not participate in a 
business may nevertheless argue that the business assets should be treated as marital assets. 
 119  See Bill Shaikin, McCourts Agree on Dodgers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011, at C1 
(reporting that Jamie McCourt had agreed to relinquish her ownership claim in exchange for 
$130 million). 
 120  See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 75, 100 (2004) (“The cornerstone of the contemporary law of marital property . . . is 
the rule of equal division upon divorce.”). Although mandatory “in only three 
jurisdictions[,]” the principle operates as a strong presumption elsewhere. Id. at 100–01. 
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Colclasure that the equitable principles of divorce law, rather than the terms of 
a buyout agreement, should control the “valuation of the marital business.”121 
Before marriage, the wife was “the sole owner and operator” of an LLC, and 
she sold a 49% stake to her fiancée for a nominal sum.122 Approximately two 
years after getting married, the couple entered into an operating agreement that 
provided a number of triggers for dissolution or buyout, including divorce, and 
specified a valuation mechanism.123 
 By filing a petition for divorce, the wife triggered the dissolution provision 
of the LLC’s operating agreement. However, the court observed that “[a] 
divorce suit is one of equitable cognizance in which the trial court has 
discretionary power to divide the marital estate.”124 Moreover, the court stated 
that, absent a valid antenuptial agreement, it was bound to follow Oklahoma’s 
divorce statute, which mandates an equitable division of marital assets.125 Even 
assuming that the parties’ operating agreement might count as a nuptial 
agreement, it had been signed after the marriage and was not cognizable under 
Oklahoma’s divorce law.126 Accordingly, the court rejected the husband’s 
argument that the operating agreement’s valuation mechanism should 
control.127 The court emphasized that the issue to be resolved was one of 
divorce law, not business law.128 
Whatever the merits of the Colclasure decision,129 the broader lesson is that 
family-law rules applicable to divorce have significant business implications. 
                                                                                                                       
 121  Colclasure v. Colclasure, 295 P.3d 1123, 1125 (Okla. 2012). The valuation question 
was the sole issue before the court on appeal. Id. A trial court judge had taken the opposite 
tact, valuing the husband’s share of the business according to the agreement. Id. 
 122  Id. at 1126. 
 123  Id. at 1126 n.7. The agreement stated that the value was to be “determined as of the 
last day of the month immediately prior to the month in which the Event of Dissolution 
occurred.”  Id. at 1127. 
 124  Id. at 1128–29. 
 125  Id. at 1129 n.13 (citation omitted) (“[T]he court shall, subject to a valid antenuptial 
contract in writing, make such division between the parties as may appear just and 
reasonable . . . .”). 
 126  Id. at 1129 (holding that the trial court erred in failing “to ensure a fair and just 
division of the marital assets” because “the only mechanism permitted by statute to override 
that obligation is an antenuptial agreement between the parties.”). The court did not address 
whether an LLC operating agreement entered into before marriage would constitute an 
antenuptial agreement under the statute. 
 127  Colclasure, 295 P.3d at 1129 (“[A] mere valuation of [the company] as of a date 
certain . . . does not determine what portion of the value of the business was the result of the 
husband’s efforts, the wife’s efforts, or their joint efforts.”). 
 128  Id. at 1131 (“The question is not whether he may be sued for breach of fiduciary 
duty, but rather whether his actions lowered [the company’s] value so that he received more 
money in the property settlement than he should have received.”). In a strongly worded 
dissent, three justices accused the court of “re-writing the parties’ contract for what appears 
to be the single purpose of increasing the wife’s settlement award.”  Id. at 1132. 
 129  Although the court did not squarely address the issue, it is unclear whether the court 
would have been willing to treat the shareholder bargain as a marital agreement, even though 
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Moreover, the threat posed by divorce continues if a family business survives 
long enough to include children and grandchildren, as their spouses may also be 
entitled to a share of business assets as marital property. Indeed, since nearly 
half of all marriages fail, the legal complications of divorce should be seen as a 
predictable, recurring feature of family-business ownership.130 
C. Family Trusts 
Family law can also affect business law when control of a family business 
passes to the next generation. As one commentator observes, “succession law is 
characterized by a need to manage multiple sets of legal rules from different 
subject matter areas that converge on the nexus of a business succession.”131 
For example, the family owners might create a trust to effectuate a transition, 
because it is possible to allocate company stock and managerial control to one 
or more members of the family without depriving other family members of 
business profits.132 Technically, the trust owns the stock and the children, who 
are beneficiaries of the trust, are not themselves owners.133 Thus, a more 
capable child or an outside manager could be selected to serve as trustee while 
the remaining offspring receive some measure of economic security through 
their beneficial trust interest.134 Alternatively, parents might give children a 
                                                                                                                       
the husband and wife were the only two shareholders and their agreement expressly 
contemplated the allocation of the firm’s assets in the event of their divorce. A refusal to 
credit the bargain elevates form over substance because overlapping substantive issues 
concerning a family business might be covered in marital agreements, shareholder 
agreements, or both. Thus, the court’s holding may have been correct as a matter of 
Oklahoma law, but it rejected the parties’ own clearly expressed intentions. 
 130  See Long & Sissel, supra note 6, at 30 (“In a mature family-owned business, one 
that has been in existence long before the marriage of one of its young shareholders, the 
founders should have engaged in business-succession planning that contemplates the 
possibility of a shareholder’s divorce.”). According to one commentator, the parties should 
consider using a buy-sell agreement to specify “that, in the event of a divorce, a former 
spouse would be required to sell any stock acquired during the marriage for its fair market 
value.”  Sildon, supra note 6, at 41. 
 131  Kenneth M. Rosen, Company Law and the Law of Succession Droit 
Commercial/Commercial Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 387, 405 (Supp. 2014). 
 132  See BORK, supra note 16, at 129 (“As a general principle, countless problems can be 
avoided if family members who do not intend to be active in the business are not left stock in 
it.”). In some cases, a simpler alternative to the creation of a trust would be to give one child 
sole ownership of the business and to leave other assets to the non-participating heirs. 
 133  The trust creates “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the 
person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property 
for the benefit of another person . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). 
 134  See, e.g., Karen E. Boxx, Too Many Tiaras: Conflicting Fiduciary Duties in the 
Family-Owned Business Context, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 233, 234–35 (2012) (describing the 
estate plan of jeweler Harry Winston). As Professor Boxx notes, “Mr. Winston had the same 
instincts as most parents in this situation: he wanted to treat his sons equally financially but 
also wanted his business-oriented son in charge of the company.”  Id. at 235. 
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stake in a business, even a majority share, without relinquishing their own 
control.135   
In trust-controlled businesses, the law of trusts supplements and can even 
supersede otherwise applicable business law.136 As settlors of the trust, parents 
appoint the trustee and have the power to ensure that their preferences are 
respected regarding the manner in which assets are disbursed. For instance, the 
settlors can direct a trustee to increase a beneficiary’s share based on need.137 
No analogous mechanism would permit a corporate manager to distribute assets 
to a particular shareholder simply because the shareholder had unrelated 
educational or medical expenses. Separating assets from the beneficial interest 
conveyed via trust may also insulate a family business should a child (or 
grandchild) divorce, and the trust structure can minimize taxes by limiting 
control and marketability with respect to the beneficial interest.  
In addition, although trustees and corporate managers owe fiduciary duties 
to beneficiaries and shareholders, respectively, the fiduciary standards are 
distinct. To the extent the fiduciary duties of a trustee are stronger than those of 
a corporate trustee, this state of affairs may provide more protection to trust 
beneficiaries than they would have as minority shareholders.138 For instance, 
while corporate managers can claim the protection of the business judgment 
rule for anything short of gross negligence, “the trustee’s default duty of care is 
set at the more restrictive reasonable person standard.”139 On the other hand, if 
the fiduciary standard is too exacting, trustees may fail to maximize business 
profits for fear of personal liability.140   
                                                                                                                       
 135  See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of 
Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 
1275; Sitkoff, supra note 64, at 646 n.122 (observing that this control can, in some cases, 
become oppressive when settlors seek “to maintain dominance over their family after 
death”). 
 136  This may be true even for governance issues involving the settlors. See Scott 
Cacciola, Plan B Eased Clippers Deal: Sterling’s Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, at 
A1, B12 (reporting that Rochelle Sterling invoked a trust provision to force the sale of the 
Los Angeles Clippers over the objection of her husband, and team co-owner, Donald 
Sterling). Apparently, the relevant “provision in the trust that controlled the 
Clippers . . . stipulated that if Mr. or Mrs. Sterling was found to have a cognitive 
impairment, the other had a fiduciary responsibility to become sole trustee.”  Id. at B12. At 
his wife’s behest, Mr. Sterling had agreed to undertake a neurological examination, and her 
lawyers used the results of that examination as “the weapon they needed to strip the team 
from Mr. Sterling.”  Id.  
 137  See Sitkoff, supra note 64, at 654. In this regard, the settlors might define medical 
and educational expenses as needs justifying an increased share or even invasion of the trust 
corpus. 
 138  Cf. Boxx, supra note 134, at 235–36 (expressing concern that when both duties may 
apply, neither is entirely satisfactory to protecting the beneficiary’s interests while also 
providing managers with the discretion necessary to manage a business). 
 139  Sitkoff, supra note 64, at 657. 
 140  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 100 (“Exposure to liability causes 
managers’ incentives to diverge from the path of wealth maximization.”). 
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The overlap of trust law and business law is also significant if a beneficiary 
would have grounds to object to the management of the business under the 
relevant business statute but faces obstacles to asserting those objections as a 
matter of trust law. When trust beneficiaries lack the ability to seek corporate 
records in order to monitor their investment or to pursue lawsuits against those 
in control of the corporation, they are more vulnerable to predatory 
misconduct.141 As a threshold matter, in order to bring an action that belongs to 
shareholders, a beneficiary must establish standing despite the lack of stock 
ownership.142 
In one case, a plaintiff sued his parents and petitioned for corporate 
dissolution alleging that the parents had abused the trust set up for his benefit 
because of their disapproval of his marriage.143 The parents each held a 1% 
stake in the business that the father had founded, and the remaining 98% was 
owned by the son as the beneficiary of a family trust managed by the parents. 
Thus, as a result of their gifts to him, the son held an overwhelming economic 
interest in the family business but had no control rights and no direct stock 
ownership. The court concluded that the son was, in effect, a minority 
shareholder as he lacked control of the investment and permitted him to petition 
for dissolution.144 
Of course, even if a beneficiary has the right to seek judicial intervention, 
additional hurdles may limit a plaintiff beneficiary’s practical ability to 
challenge trust distributions. First, distributions need not be made on a pro rata 
basis, unless the trust agreement so specifies.145 Thus, subject to a general 
                                                                                                                       
 141  See Judith Schemel Suelzle, Note, Trust Beneficiary Standing in Shareholder 
Derivative Actions, 39 STAN. L. REV. 267, 267–68 (1986) (analyzing trusts, including 
various employee pension and stock ownership plans, and noting substantial state 
disagreement as to whether beneficial owners of stock can assert derivative actions when the 
trustee fails to do so). 
 142  Id. 
 143  Berger v. Berger, 592 A.2d 321, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (noting that 
plaintiff’s marriage “affected the family’s operations of its business and resulted 
in . . . litigation”). 
 144  Id. at 328. The court properly rejected the defendants’ alternative argument that their 
son could not bring a claim as a minority shareholder because, if his beneficial interest 
counted as stock ownership for purposes of standing, 98% was not a minority position. Id. at 
326–28. The court instead adopted a functional perspective and allocated fiduciary duties to 
the parents because they had the power to control the investment. Id. at 327–28. For a 
similar approach, see Smith v. Atlantic Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1981), holding that twenty-five percent shareholder’s veto power gave him the ability to 
obstruct corporate action and, therefore, a fiduciary responsibility not to damage the 
business. 
 145  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816(22), 7C U.L.A. 629–30 (2000) (authorizing trustee to 
“allocate particular assets in proportionate or disproportionate shares”). By contrast, “the 
law . . . provides certain core protections to minority shareholders in both public and close 
corporations, including the prohibition of non-pro-rata distributions . . . .”  Means, A Voice-
Based Framework, supra note 67, at 1239; see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 
717, 721–22 (Del. 1971). 
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obligation of impartiality, the trustee can exercise discretion concerning the 
distribution of assets.146 Second, because a beneficiary has no legal claim to 
benefits beyond whatever a settlor chooses to provide, the beneficiary’s interest 
may be tied to conditions,147 including even a prohibition against challenges to 
the operative agreement.148 
For example, the six siblings who now own Luray Caverns, a tourist-
attraction near Washington, D.C., have been battling for years, aligned roughly 
in two camps—the older siblings and the younger siblings.149 A key issue 
concerns “the management of the trusts that control[] their inheritance.”150 As a 
reporter explains, “[i]n the middle of all this fighting—and allegedly 
unbeknownst to [the older siblings]—their parents rewrote their wills and put in 
no-contest provisions that would be triggered if any of the siblings opposed 
their parents on appointments to the trusts.”151 Relying on those provisions, 
now that the parents have both died, the younger “siblings sued [the older 
siblings] to void their inheritances.”152 The battle for corporate control is also, 
centrally, a family dispute about inheritance. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the shape of family-business ownership is 
affected by the absence of family law controls over testamentary choices. 
Unlike many other countries in which children have a legal claim to their 
parent’s wealth,153 jurisdictions within the United States adhere with few 
exceptions to a principle of testamentary freedom that gives individuals the 
discretion to distribute their assets in any manner they see fit.154 While it may 
                                                                                                                       
 146  See Sitkoff, supra note 64, at 651 (contending that trust law’s flexibility can be 
explained by the need to reconcile the often “conflicting interests of different classes of 
beneficiaries”). In a corporation, the law “assumes that all shareholders share the basic aim 
of profit maximization . . . .”  Id. 
 147  See Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2180, 2193 (2011) (“A testator may saddle a bequest with conditions.”). 
 148  Id. at 2207 (noting that “[s]tates have divided over whether . . . a ‘no-contest’ or ‘in 
terrorem’ clause is effective”). 
 149  See Ken Otterbourg, The Rift—A Family Dynasty Fights over the Future of Luray 
Caverns, WASH. POST, (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
liveblog/wp/2013/03/14/magazine-the-rift-a-family-dynasty-fights-over-the-future-of-luray-
caverns/, archived at http://perma.cc/J2EC-SYMW. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. The dispute has not yet been resolved on its merits. Id. 
 153  See Hirsch, supra note 147, at 2233 (“In most countries, bequests to children are 
compulsory.”). 
 154  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 cmt. a (2003). Disinherited family members must allege undue influence, coercion, or 
the like in order to overturn a will. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Two Wills, One Private 
Heiress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2013, at MB1 (describing a will that includes the statement  
“I intentionally make no provision in this my Last Will Testament for any members of my 
family”). Instead, the decedent left her $300 million estate to an arts foundation as well as a 
non-family caretaker, a doctor responsible for her care, her accountant, and her lawyer. Id. 
Her “grandnephews, grandnieces, great-grandnephews and great-grandnieces” now allege 
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be natural to expect that family members will care for each other, and to rely 
upon family as the institution of first resort for handling illness and infirmity,155 
adult children and their parents have no legal claims upon one another. 
Accordingly, obligations concerning a family business may be created and 
adjusted through private ordering and may reinforce or reject expectations 
created by more intimate connections among the participants. 
D. Tax Considerations 
The previous examples focus on disputes within the family business, 
describing how family law affects issues of ownership, governance, 
distribution, and fiduciary duty. Business law offers an incomplete account of 
such disputes because it neglects the relevance of legal obligations rooted in 
family relationships. This section shows that the connection between business 
law and family law can also be inverted: in some cases, a family business offers 
a mechanism for preserving family wealth by recharacterizing it.156 
For instance, while there is no rule prohibiting family members from doing 
business together as partners, “a family partnership may represent no more than 
a thinly veiled attempt to fracture the personal income of a taxpayer in a high-
income tax bracket between himself and related persons . . . in lower 
brackets.”157 Such allocations violate the basic principle that income should be 
assigned to the person responsible for generating it.158 
Before changes to the tax code were adopted to tax household income 
jointly,159 the assignment-of-income question could be particularly troublesome 
                                                                                                                       
that she was “coerced into changing [her will] by people around her, who, along with the 
hospital, kept her dependent and exploited her age and vulnerability.”  Id. at MB1, MB6. 
None of these would-be heirs had seen the deceased in many years. Id. at MB6.  However 
the dispute may eventually be resolved, it underscores that the transmission of family wealth 
across generations is a matter of choice, not right. 
 155  See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 
60 EMORY L.J. 251, 263 (2010) (“The family is the mechanism by which we privatize, and 
thus hide dependency and its implications.”). 
 156  Cf. Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“This Article 
approaches the issues of how to define marriage and its proper place in our legal landscape 
from a different perspective. Instead of asking the question of what marriage is, the Article 
tries to determine what marriage is not. It does so by examining when and why the law 
determines that a particular marriage is a ‘sham’ or a ‘fraud.’”). As Professor Abrams 
observes, studying the legal restriction of a concept can help illuminate its core purpose: 
“[t]he fraud doctrines, in other words, tell us what work the law is asking marriage to do.”  
Id. at 5. 
 157  William S. McKee et al., Development of the Family Partnership Rules, FED. TAX’N 
OF PARTNERSHIPS & PARTNERS ¶ 15.01 (2012). 
 158  See id. 
 159  See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 339 
(1994) (“The federal income tax treats a married couple as a single economic unit. Spouses 
report their combined income on a joint return, and calculate their tax liability based on that 
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if a household allocated business income to a spouse in a lower tax bracket, 
thereby reducing the family’s overall tax obligation.160 When the IRS 
challenged the existence of a business partnership, courts had to decide whether 
both spouses were genuinely involved in a productive enterprise or whether 
business partnership designations had been made purely for tax purposes.161 
Because family businesses are embedded in a family context, with 
overlapping economic considerations, such distinctions are not easily drawn. In 
Commissioner v. Culbertson, the Supreme Court held that the inquiry into 
partnership status for tax purposes was necessarily fact intensive and included 
an assessment of 
[W]hether, considering all the facts—the agreement, the conduct of the parties 
in execution of its provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested 
persons, the relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital 
contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is 
used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent—the parties in 
good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the 
present conduct of the enterprise.162 
Rejecting the Culbertson approach, Congress amended the law to clarify 
that a partnership designation for tax purposes is valid if the partner “owns a 
capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing 
factor, whether or not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any 
other person.”163 The tax rules are complex,164 and the requisite “ownership” 
can be debated, but it is enough for our purposes to see that Congress decided 
                                                                                                                       
combined income.”). This approach was first instituted in 1948. See Revenue Act of 1948, 
Pub. L. No. 80-471, §§ 301, 303, 305, 62 Stat. 110, 114–16. 
 160  See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930). By contrast, the current 
approach uses a “joint-return rate schedule” that awards a “marriage bonus” to single-earner 
families, because the rate schedule achieves the equivalent of income splitting by applying a 
lower rate than would apply to an individual’s income, and imposes a “marriage penalty” on 
dual-earning families with equal incomes, because the rate schedule is higher than the 
equivalent split if each earner were taxed as an individual. See Zelenak, supra note 159, at 
340–41. For further discussion of the consequences of the joint-filing rules, see Dorothy A. 
Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 800–03 (2007) and 
Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395–96 
(1975). 
 161  See, e.g., Comm’r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 283 (1946). 
 162  Comm’r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). 
 163  26 U.S.C. § 704(e)(1) (2012). 
 164  For instance, and to cite only one difficult issue, the availability of the classification 
turns on the distinction between partnerships in which capital is material to the generation of 
income and those in which it is not. Id. One commentator observes that our tax system 
actually relies upon two distinct conceptions of family, depending upon whether the 
objective is to facilitate the extension of benefits or to constrict abuses. See Tessa R. Davis, 
Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript on file with author). 
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not to examine the details of family business structure, so that “questions 
regarding the business or tax avoidance motivation for a transfer of a 
partnership capital interest to a family member are thus largely irrelevant.”165 
Households are now taxed as a unit, but issues concerning the allocation of 
taxable income within a family continue to arise in partnership cases involving 
children or other relatives.166 
Tax considerations also explain the use of limited partnerships and LLCs as 
an estate-planning device. The crucial features for tax purposes are that the 
limited partners have no right to control the investment—only general partners 
or voting members of the LLC have that authority—and no right to exit the 
investment and to redeem their membership interest. Accordingly, the IRS 
accepts substantial deductions to account for a limited partner’s lack of control 
and the absence of an available market for the partnership interest, even if those 
vulnerabilities are of no real consequence within a family context.167 Thus, 
transferring limited-partnership shares to a child, instead of the equivalent cash 
value in a will, helps the transferor take advantage of the gap between family 
expectations and objective market value.168 
The notion that a limited-partnership interest would trade at all, apart from 
the family context, is unrealistic for reasons that Professor Brant Hellwig has 
explained: 
Because the transferee of a partnership interest is guaranteed only to receive 
distributions that would have been made to the transferor, an unrelated third 
party would discount the value of the transferred interest on account of the 
inability to participate in decisions affecting management of the partnership 
affairs. Furthermore, due to the transferee’s inability to require the partnership 
interest to be redeemed and the absence of an established market on which an 
                                                                                                                       
 165  McKee et al., supra note 157, ¶ 15.01[2] (citing S. REP. NO. 82-781, at 38 (1951) 
and H.R. REP. NO. 82-586, at 32 (1951) (stating intent to “harmonize the rules governing 
interests in the so-called family partnership with those generally applicable to other forms of 
property or business”)). 
 166  Note that the tax rule applicable to married couples defeats, if only for tax purposes, 
any contrary allocation of ownership interests in a partnership that the couple might 
otherwise devise. In effect, the equal profits default rule of partnership law becomes 
mandatory. See Zelenak, supra note 159, at 344 (“The standard justification for joint returns 
is that the typical married couple pools its income. Since the couple acts as a single 
economic unit, it should be taxed as a single economic unit.”). 
 167  Brant J. Hellwig, Revisiting Byrum, 23 VA. TAX REV. 275, 278 (2003). 
 168  Id. at 277–78 (“It is common knowledge that valuation discounts are the driving 
force behind the widespread use of limited partnerships to transmit wealth.”). Given the 
law’s refusal to acknowledge the family setting in which limited partnerships often operate, 
“these entities are well suited to exploit a structural flaw in the transfer tax system—the 
requirement that ‘value’ be measured on an objective basis by hypothesizing an exchange 
between unrelated, disinterested third parties.”  Id. at 278. However, the family limited 
partnership planning technique remains contentious and, in some circumstances, may not be 
viable. See Carter G. Bishop, The Ebb and Flow of the Federal Tax Role of Fiduciary Duties 
in Family Limited Partnerships: From Byrum to Bongard, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 61, 64 (2006). 
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interest in a closely held partnership can be readily liquidated, the value of the 
transferred interest will be discounted to reflect its lack of marketability. While 
one may sense an air of fabrication relating to the asserted discounts, the 
discounts are genuine. The air of fabrication exists because the likelihood of an 
interest in a family owned partnership ever being sold in an arm’s-length 
exchange to an unrelated third party is virtually nonexistent.169 
Nevertheless, the law hypothesizes a bargain negotiated at arm’s length, and 
limited partnership interests can often claim a substantial deduction for 
supposed impairments of value.170 Whether or not the use of limited 
partnerships as a family tax-planning device undermines the integrity of the 
estate tax through a kind of relationship arbitrage,171 the popularity of the 
technique highlights the overlap of family relationships and business choices. In 
sum, the subtlety of family and business connections can create opportunities 
for tax reduction strategies that the law only imperfectly apprehends and 
sometimes chooses to ignore. The choice of business entity form reflects family 
and business considerations. 
IV. PRIVATE ORDERING IN FAMILY BUSINESSES 
This Part contends that a contractual conception of the firm can account for 
distinctive characteristics of family businesses. Part IV.A shows that private 
ordering already exists on both sides of the family-business equation and 
provides a flexible model for mapping their intersections. Part IV.B contends 
that the shared language of contract does not ignore family values and, instead, 
provides a useful mechanism for expressing them. Part IV.C further defends the 
contractual approach by examining how marital, trust, and inheritance 
agreements can align legal rights and expectations in a family-owned business. 
A. Common Ground 
Though their formal legal doctrines diverge, businesses and families are 
both institutions that facilitate cooperative relationships designed, in important 
part, to achieve economic objectives.172 Business organization laws permit the 
entry of individuals into long-term relationships to achieve shared purposes, 
                                                                                                                       
 169  Hellwig, supra note 167, at 278 n.8. 
 170  See id. 
 171  See id. at 279 (citing Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs 
Ammunition In Its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 1461, 1466 (2000) (“It is apparent 
that the family limited partnership, as evolved, is in danger of making the estate tax truly 
voluntary.”)). 
 172  See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 37, at 777 (“The mark of a capitalistic society is 
that resources are owned and allocated by such nongovernmental organizations as firms, 
households, and markets.”). 
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partly defined by the state and subject to its regulation.173 Similarly, the 
institution of marriage gives legal recognition to the voluntary union of two 
people, and, if needed, judicial monitoring of their rights and obligations.174 In 
each context, the parties’ relationship is said to be contractual,175 even if some 
aspects are mandatory or subject to fiduciary constraint.176 
Accordingly, in addressing the needs of family businesses, it would be a 
mistake to treat the business-law aspects as contractual and the family-law 
aspects as status-based.177 Historically, it is certainly true that the marriage 
contract represented the voluntary assumption of a state-determined status.178 
Increasingly, however, courts and legislatures have permitted individuals to 
strike bargains concerning their family relationships.179 Building upon these 
                                                                                                                       
 173  See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365–66 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932). 
 174  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 761 (11th ed. 2003) (defining 
traditional marriage as “the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband 
or wife in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law”). Until relatively 
recently, “the state, and not individual marriage partners, determined many of the 
consequences of marital status.”  Singer, supra note 13, at 1446. 
 175  Courts treat questions of governance and distribution largely as default matters 
subject to modification by the parties. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 1758, 1779 (2005); Singer, supra note 13, at 1567 (“A preference for private over 
public ordering has characterized the development of family law over the past quarter 
century.”). 
 176  See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of 
Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1597 (2009) (“Traditionally, legal 
regulation of marriage expressed and supported shared moral principles and interests of 
society as a whole, sometimes even at the cost of limiting the couple’s freedoms.”); 
Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1505 (observing that the characterization of corporate law as a 
series of default rules ignores important mandatory provisions that cannot be abrogated by 
the parties). 
 177  See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 2, at 808 (describing the shift toward codification 
of the principle that shareholder bargains are valid in close corporations, even if they 
impinge upon the role of the board of directors); Means, supra note 3, at 1220 (“In some 
respects, the gradual recognition of contractual bargaining within domestic relationships 
resembles the process by which courts became willing to enforce shareholder agreements in 
close corporations . . . .”). 
 178  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 154  
(1765–1769) (stating that because “husband and wife are one person in law” a contractual 
relationship is conceptually impossible); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 371 (1978) (arguing that courts “refused to enforce 
agreements between husband and wife affecting the internal organization of family life” 
because legal intervention is inconsistent with “successful human association [that] depends 
upon spontaneous and informal collaboration”). 
 179  See Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private 
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 81–82 (2001) (listing “matters such as entry 
into marriage, contractual ordering of marriage, nonmarital relationships, divorce, adoption, 
the use of reproductive technologies, and the privatization of domestic relations dispute 
resolution”). 
708 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:4 
 
advances, and the freedom of contract now widely recognized in business 
organization law,180 family law scholars have argued for even greater 
recognition of private ordering in family law.181 Through contract, families can 
define their own boundaries and recognize new forms of intimacy.182 
 As a practical matter, given the availability of contract in the family 
context, private ordering in family businesses extends beyond the traditional 
subject matter of business contracts. This is as it should be. After all, the central 
insights of the contractual conception of the firm are that “shareholders’ rights 
and duties are (or should be) defined by contract[,] . . . that corporate law should 
be ‘enabling’ rather than mandatory[,] . . . [and] that no particular set of 
outcomes is best for all firms.”183 Rather than adhering to a formalistic and 
narrow conception of business law that would limit the parties’ ability to 
integrate their business and family objectives, the contractual nexus should 
encompass all agreements that relate to the family business.184 
The participants’ family relationships may also provide important context 
for the interpretation of family-business contracts. For instance, in a post-trial 
decision upholding a daughter’s contractual claim based upon the termination of 
her employment with the family business, the court recognized that family 
considerations had motivated the parties’ business bargain: 
The parties’ intent in entering into the Shareholders Agreement was not to 
establish an operational model for the Company, defining the individual 
                                                                                                                       
 180  See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 365, 370 (1992). 
 181  See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2039–40 (2010); Ertman, supra note 
179 at 81–82. Other scholars contend that describing families as contracts ignores power 
disparities and elides the parties’ emotional commitments. See, e.g., Laura Weinrib, 
Reconstructing Family: Constructive Trust at Relational Dissolution, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 207, 209 (2002) (“The contractualization of family law has led to the sterilization of 
the family.”). 
 182  See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and 
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 364 (2004). Even when 
family law rules remain mandatory, rational business participants will still take them into 
account. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-Organization Law, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 751, 754 (2005) (“Federal tax, securities, bankruptcy laws, and some state 
non-organization laws are important because firms can minimize their impact only by 
complying or changing their transaction form.”). 
 183  See Macey, supra note 65, at 1269. 
 184  To erect a barrier to voluntary contracting when family relationships are at issue 
would be inconsistent with the more general recognition that the parties themselves are in 
the best position to establish the rules for their business venture. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 18-1101(b) (2013) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company 
agreements.”). 
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shareholders’ rights and responsibilities. Rather, the Shareholders Agreement 
was meant to be an estate-planning tool.185 
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s contractual argument regarding the meaning of 
“executive duties” prevailed notwithstanding her limited role in the business.186 
That is, because the parents intended to distribute assets to their daughter 
through the company, her level of participation was not relevant to the 
arrangement.187 
However, some might counsel a narrower view of private ordering in 
family-owned businesses in order to respect the supposedly “separate spheres” 
of intimacy and markets.188 According to this objection, family relationships are 
extraneous to the nexus of business contracts because firms are economic 
institutions and economic actors will rationally pursue their own advantage.189  
By contrast, family is an institution that protects a sphere of intimacy apart from 
competitive market relationships.190 Even if families could be re-described in 
the language of economics,191 the typical range of family concerns may seem 
far removed from the narrower economic objectives of a business 
corporation.192 Thus, according to some scholars, the residual role of family 
relationships is to establish a background of trust that can reduce the transaction 
costs of forming and operating a firm.193 
                                                                                                                       
 185  Federico v. Brancato, No. 50902(U), slip op. at *7–8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 9, 2014) 
(citing Peter Mahler, Interview with Law Professor Benjamin Means on Conflict in Family-
Owned Businesses: Part Two, N.Y. BUS. DIVORCE (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2013/02/articles/interviews/interview-with-law-
professor-benjamin-means-on-conflict-in-family-owned-businesses-part-two). 
 186  Id. at *8. 
 187  Id. 
 188  See ZELIZER, supra note 12, at 23 (noting that “worries about the incompatibility, 
incommensurability, or contradiction between intimate and impersonal relations are long-
standing and persistent”). 
 189  See O’Kelley, Jr., supra note 2, at 220 (“Rational individuals invest their human and 
money capital with a view to maximizing the value of such resources.”); Butler, supra note 
9, at 109 (noting that the contractual theory of corporate law is “based in part on the 
assumption that the shareholders’ primary interest is in the maximization of the value of 
their investments”). 
 190  Singer, supra note 13, at 1522 (“[T]he values associated with a ‘successful’ 
family—altruism, sympathy, mutualism—were precisely those that were viewed as 
incompatible with success in the economic sphere.”). Also, some aspects of family life may 
not be commodities, or ought not to be treated as such. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1923–28 (1987). 
 191  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 237 (1981) (extending 
assumption of rationality to choices regarding marriage, children, and friendships); GARY S. 
BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 169–94 (1976). 
 192  See ASHFORTH, supra note 89, at 139 (“Work and home are often stereotypically 
perceived as opposites on many dimensions.”). 
 193  For instance, “if family-owned ventures reduce the agency costs of management, 
there will be gains for all to share.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 232. 
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In truth, families cannot be excluded from the economic sphere, because no 
family can avoid economic considerations.194 The household is the original unit 
of economic analysis and the source of the word economics.195 Consider, for 
example, one successful author’s account of marital problems caused by a 
changed economic dynamic:  
 
We expected that things would proceed one way—he’d be the primary 
breadwinner, a successful attorney, and I’d make less money, stay home with 
the kids, with fiction essentially a lucrative hobby . . . . When it didn’t work out 
that way, I think we both had a hard time rewriting the contract of the 
marriage.196  
 
Whether or not a family owns and operates a business, the family must address 
questions of economic production and exchange and reconcile economic 
activity with other expectations.197 
In sum, because the economic concerns of business and family do not reside 
in separate spheres, contractual adjustments can help to clarify the parties’ 
expectations. Indeed, the parties may use contracts to establish a boundary 
between family and business, as when a prenuptial agreement defines business 
assets as non-marital property. Regardless of the parties’ objectives, if private 
ordering is accepted in the family-law context, and if the stakeholders in a 
business are also free to bargain amongst themselves, there seems to be little 
basis left for rejecting broader bargains that address real-world concerns in 
family businesses.198 
                                                                                                                       
 194  See ZELIZER, supra note 12, at 13 (“Economic transactions include all social 
interactions involving consumption, production, and distribution of goods, services, or the 
means of acquiring them—for example, when one sibling buys a car from another, an 
immigrant father supervises his daughter’s work in the family store, a salesman spreads free 
samples among his close friends, or parents lend their children money for purchase of a 
home.”); Piper v. Hoard, 13 N.E. 626, 629 (N.Y. 1887) (“Marriage has its sentimental and 
its business sides.”). 
 195  Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around 
the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 232 n.14 (2006) (“Although oikos [house] is the 
etymological root of ‘economics,’ until recent decades few economists have paid more than 
passing attention to home economics.”). 
 196  Rebecca Mead, Written Off: Jennifer Weiner’s Quest for Literary Respect, NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 13, 2014, at 37, 40. 
 197  See ZELIZER, supra note 12, at 13. 
 198  To be clear, this does not mean that family dynamics of power and status should be 
irrelevant to contract interpretation and enforcement. Rather, those concerns exist across 
different contractual subject matter and should be addressed in consistent fashion. See, e.g., 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 801 
(1982) (arguing that the administrative simplicity of strict enforcement of contractual 
bargains should be weighed against the possible injustices that can result). See also infra 
Part V.C. 
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B. Respecting Values 
Acknowledging the economic concerns that families and businesses share 
should not obscure differences in their respective values. From a certain 
remove, one could instead argue that families and businesses amount to the 
same thing—ways of organizing to accomplish collective, largely economic 
purposes. In this vein, one commentator defines marriage as “a written, oral, or 
customary long-term contract between a man and a woman to produce children, 
food, and other commodities in a common household.”199 If family and 
business were “nothing-but” economics and their only differences concerned 
the goods sought by the parties, the nature of transaction costs, and the terms of 
the default contract, then the goal of family-business law would be to provide a 
single, coherent conception of value, largely consistent with the law and 
economics view of rational choice.200 
Notwithstanding its origins in financial economics, the contractual 
conception of the firm places no such limits on the interests of contracting 
parties and, therefore, does not require us to deny the distinctive values of 
families and businesses.201 Recall that the economists’ theory of the firm uses 
the building block of open-market transactions—contract—to construct an 
alternative to markets.202 Contract should be seen as a means of expressing 
values and making them legally enforceable, rather than a concept that imposes 
values.203 Accordingly, the fact that businesses and families engage in private 
ordering tells us little about what it is they value and have reason to value.204 In 
a family business, the ability to choose among different plausible options is 
particularly important. 
Even so, as a practical matter, it is unclear whether the participants in a 
family business benefit from the freedom to order their business affairs with as 
                                                                                                                       
 199  GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 43 (enlarged ed. 1991). 
 200  According to Professor Vivian Zelizer, “[i]mpatient with stark dualisms, critics have 
sometimes countered separate spheres and hostile worlds accounts with reductionist nothing 
but arguments: the ostensibly separate world of intimate social relations, they argue, is 
nothing-but a special case of some general principle.”  ZELIZER, supra note 12, at 29. 
 201  See Ivan Lansberg S., Managing Human Resources in Family Firms: The Problem 
of Institutional Overlap, 12 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 39, 42 (1983) (“The exchange of 
resources in the family is guided by implicit affective principles that focus . . . on the needs 
and long-term well-being of the other, rather than on the specific value of the goods and 
services . . . .”). By contrast, “the norm of fairness that operates in the firm is based on the 
concept of merit.”  Id. 
 202  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 311. 
 203  However, courts may still invoke public policy concerns and refuse to enforce a 
private bargain if the subject matter is perceived as inimical to “the public good.”  
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 159, 163 (2013). 
 204  At the most, we might say that the immanent value of contract is that autonomy and 
choice at a local level is to be given effect, up to a point, even when individual choices 
conflict with public values. 
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little interference as possible.205 It could be the case that autonomy creates more 
problems than it solves in many situations, and that family members might 
prefer a more stable set of legal outcomes that could defuse tension in the 
family-business context by providing an external rationale for choices that 
might otherwise engender competition, conflict, and allegations of 
favoritism.206 Perhaps, then, flexibility and stability are opposing values. 
The contractual conception of the firm does not, however, force family 
members to bargain at arm’s length and to rethink all aspects of their mutual 
relationships. To the contrary, family-business law informed by evidence of the 
choices families make, including common mistakes, could serve as a resource—
a best-practices synthesis of business law and family law. In some cases, as 
when a child is given a beneficial interest in a trust or shares of a corporation, 
there is no literal bargain.207 Nevertheless, envisioning a broad set of voluntary 
business and family relationships makes it possible to catalogue options so that 
default rules broadly match expectations. Indeed, “contract supposes and 
depends on a rich background of social norms to stabilize the parties’ 
expectations and to guide legal interpretations of their obligations.”208 
Moreover, even to the extent a contractual approach to family-business law 
might encourage the parties to replace informal relationships of trust with more 
explicit bargaining, the consequences of a move from relationship to contract 
                                                                                                                       
 205  In some circumstances, a policy designed to maximize individual autonomy can 
produce perverse results and may not even reflect the values of the individuals whose 
autonomy is at stake. See Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 
437 (2006) (summarizing research that “while patients largely wish to be informed about 
their medical circumstances, substantial numbers of them do not want to make their own 
decisions, or perhaps even to participate in those decisions in any truly significant way”). 
 206  In this sense, the external character of the legal rule may be important. For instance, 
in affirming the constitutionality of a school drug-testing program, Justice Breyer cited 
evidence of the efficacy of such programs: in particular, they help vulnerable children resist 
peer pressure by providing an acceptable rationale for avoiding drugs. See Bd. of Educ. of 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840–41 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“It 
offers the adolescent a nonthreatening reason to decline his friend’s drug-use invitations, 
namely, that he intends to play baseball, participate in debate, join the band, or engage in any 
one of half a dozen useful, interesting, and important activities.”). Without equating adults 
with children, it may be true, and for similar reasons, that family business law can provide a 
neutral, authoritative answer to questions that would otherwise provoke conflict. 
 207  See Sitkoff, supra note 64, at 639 (contending, in the context of trust law, that “even 
if the beneficiaries do not literally contract with the other principal parties, . . . contractarian 
principal-agent modeling nonetheless illuminates the problems of governance relevant to the 
beneficiaries’ welfare”). Therefore, according to Professor Sitkoff, “greater insight into the 
nature and function of trust law will come from a conception of the trust as a de facto entity 
that serves as the organizing construct for an aggregation of contractarian relationships.”  Id. 
 208  Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1446 (2010) 
(citing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 211–12 (George Simpson 
trans., Macmillan Co. 1933) (1893)). 
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can be overstated.209 Admittedly, it is possible that impersonal legal protections 
can substitute for human relationships, thereby undercutting an important 
rationale for family-business ownership.210 In the right circumstances, though, 
invoking contractual values can induce family-business participants to be more 
deliberative, anticipating conflicts before they arise.211 
If done in a manner respectful of the relationships that exist among the 
parties, the process of tailoring default principles can be as beneficial as the 
agreed-upon substantive rules. In this regard, the formality inherent in operating 
a business might help family members to broach sensitive issues in the first 
place. For instance, a conversation about a prenuptial agreement could be 
perceived as constructive and appropriate in the context of a family business 
that involves other family members.212 
C. The Nexus of Family-Business Contracts 
This section argues that the contractual conception of the firm, as applied to 
family businesses, includes marital agreements, trust instruments, and 
inheritance contracts because they empower families to allocate the ownership 
and control of business assets. That contractual flexibility has particular 
                                                                                                                       
 209  The concerns, to be clear, are that contractual explanations lack the nuance 
necessary to appreciate the importance of social trust and that private ordering is not an 
adequate substitute for interpersonal trust. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Individual and 
Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2233 (1992) 
(reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991)) (“One problem with such an account is the abiding expectation 
that people, presumably being detached rogues bound only by ‘gappy’ contracts rather than 
real trust, would invariably cheat if only they could find more ingenious ways to do so.”). 
 210  See Means, supra note 3, at 1194 (noting that family businesses can offer “intrinsic 
and not merely instrumental value”). 
 211  The constructive role of contract is one reason that family law scholars have argued 
in favor of private ordering as a strategy for organizing family life. See, e.g., Ertman, supra 
note 179, at 79. 
 212  On the other hand, this strategy may produce the opposite result: 
 
Rule #5: Do Not Blame Your Parents 
My best friend’s boyfriend wanted a prenup. He had a trust fund. Of like $500,000. He 
raised the subject one night. She balked. So immediately he reverted to this pussyfooted 
excuse: “My dad is making me!” That line of reasoning didn’t go over so well. “It made 
me even madder!” she tells me. “It’s one thing if he owned up to it, but it’s a whole 
different issue if he’s just blindly obeying his parents. Who wants to marry someone 
who doesn’t make his own decisions?” Touché. (P.S. They are now happily married 
with kids and no prenup.) 
 
Siobhan Rosen, With This Prenup, I Thee Wed, GQ.COM (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.gq.com/life/relationships/201309/prenup-agreement-marriage-
engagement?mbid=gqpr, archived at http://perma.cc/3EZT-HR7R. 
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importance when the default rules of business law or family law would 
otherwise violate the parties’ expectations. 
1. Marital Agreements 
Because marriage superimposes an economic partnership in which assets 
are shared equally on top of business arrangements that may contemplate a 
different allocation, marital agreements may be needed to align the parties’ 
rights and expectations. Further, the terms and conditions of marital agreements 
may be part of a broader business bargain.213 Consider, for instance, the Swigs, 
whose marriage “united two of America’s great real estate clans.”214 After 
suffering huge losses during the economic downturn of 2008, Mr. Swig 
obtained a business loan of $200,000 from his in-laws, the Macklowes.215 In 
exchange, Mr. Swig entered into a postnuptial agreement providing that, “[i]n 
the event of a divorce, Ms. Swig would get both homes, while he would assume 
responsibility for the debts against the properties.”216 
The loan from the Macklowes might be described, in isolation, as 
establishing a debtor-creditor relationship with respect to a discrete business 
venture, but it can only be appreciated in the full context of the family 
relationship.217 In particular, the Macklowes’ help was conditioned upon a 
postnuptial agreement that protected the economic interests of Ms. Swig, their 
                                                                                                                       
 213  In fact, the absence of a marital agreement may be notable. See David F. Larcker et 
al., Separation Anxiety: The Impact of CEO Divorce on Shareholders, STAN. CLOSER LOOK 
SERIES, Oct. 1, 2013, at 1 (“[W]hen news leaked that Harold Hamm, Chairman and CEO of 
Continental Resources, was getting divorced from wife Sue Ann of 25 years, shares of the 
company fell 2.9 percent. The Hamms did not sign a premarital contract, making Harold’s 
68 percent ownership stake (worth $11.2 billion) subject to equitable distribution under 
Oklahoma family law.”); Tom Fowler, Divorce Clouds Billionaire’s Stake in Oil-Drilling 
Giant, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2014, at B4. 
 214  Julie Creswell, Breakup at 740 Park Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2014, at B1. Even 
before the marriage, each spouse had a stake in the real-estate world because of family 
connections. See id. at B4 (“Mr. Swig had reached this lofty perch the old-fashioned way: 
inheritance. He is the grandson of Benjamin Swig, who . . . began building a real estate 
dynasty.”). 
 215  Id. 
 216  Id. (“She would also get almost $12 million in art-work, including works by Jeff 
Koons and Takashi Murakami.”). The business loan may not state that it is conditional upon 
the marital agreement, but both contracts were entered on the same day and the timing 
cannot have been coincidental. Id. 
 217  Id. For instance, the loan contained “an unusual clause: The Macklowes agreed that 
they would not encourage or support any attempt to push Mr. Swig into involuntary 
bankruptcy.” Although an unusual stipulation for an ordinary business creditor, it can be 
explained by the Macklowes’ interest in the stability of their daughter’s marriage. When the 
apparent rationale for the no-bankruptcy clause vanished, the Macklowes disregarded it: 
“Five months later, in March 2010, Kent Swig filed for divorce. And soon Harry 
Macklowe . . . began to break the promise he had made when he gave his son-in-law the 
loan.” Id. 
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daughter. Functionally, the business loan and the marital agreement were 
connected, just as the Swigs’ marriage mixed real estate and intimacy. A few 
months later, when the Swigs entered into divorce proceedings, the New York 
Times observed that the Swigs’ divorce “ends more than a married life of galas 
at the Whitney and scenes in the Hamptons. It also represents the dissolution of 
the Macklowe-Swig business relationship.”218 A contractual model that 
includes family and business bargains helps us to perceive the Swigs’ real-estate 
business as they themselves would have understood it: an economic partnership 
founded by marriage in which family and business interests were inseparable. 
Marital agreements are not just a bargaining chip; they can play a crucial, 
independent role in family-business planning by specifying whether business 
assets are to be treated as marital property.219 While the Swigs’ marital 
agreement seems to have been designed to protect Ms. Swig’s interest in the 
non-business assets of the marriage by allocating those assets to her, it also 
designated Mr. Swig as the owner of the real-estate businesses, including their 
debts. With his ownership rights clarified by contract, Mr. Swig is now in a 
position to resuscitate the business ventures, if he can.220 Thus, setting aside the 
Macklowes’ apparent ability to dictate terms, the parties used a contract to 
allocate their assets in accordance with the risk tolerances and preferences of 
each spouse. 
In a contested divorce, the enforceability of a marital agreement may decide 
the fate of the family business.221 A recent divorce involving the Los Angeles 
Dodgers provides a useful illustration.222 In 2004, Frank McCourt purchased the 
Dodgers team (including the stadium and surrounding real property) for 421 
million dollars. Mr. McCourt had been very successful in Boston real estate and 
Jamie McCourt, after attending law school, served as General Counsel of the 
McCourt Companies—the family business. In early 2009, Ms. McCourt 
“became chief executive of the team and the highest-ranking woman in Major 
League Baseball . . . .”223 In July 2009, however, the couple separated and Ms. 
                                                                                                                       
 218  Id. 
 219  Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 268 (“A large proportion of marital property rules are defaults: the law 
leaves some room for spouses to contract around provisions for the division of property on 
divorce and for the governance of marital property during marriage.”). 
 220  Creswell, supra note 214, at B4 (“In the real estate game, fortunes are made, lost 
and, sometimes, remade. Mr. Swig, his spokesman said, is ‘currently seeking real estate 
opportunities in which to invest and develop.’”). The article does not indicate any challenge 
to the terms of the marital agreement. 
 221  The consequences of divorce will be particularly harsh in so-called “‘copreneurial 
businesses’—firms where husbands and wives jointly own or work in a business together.” 
W. Gibb Dyer et al., Should My Spouse Be My Partner? Preliminary Evidence from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 26 FAM. BUS. REV. 68, 68 (2012). Worldwide, 
“copreneurial firms represent about one third of all family businesses.”  Id.  
 222  See also supra Part III.B. 
 223  Bill Shaikin, Jamie McCourt Wanted to ‘Renege’ on Post-Marital Agreement 
Involving Dodgers Because of Political Ambitions, Attorney Says, L.A. TIMES  (Aug. 30, 
716 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:4 
 
McCourt filed for divorce in October. The ensuing litigation concerned 
ownership of the Dodgers. Mr. McCourt claimed sole ownership, while Ms. 
McCourt alleged that she was a 50% owner.224 
As a matter of family law, this would have been an easy case. The Dodgers 
were acquired during the marriage and there was no question that Ms. McCourt 
contributed substantially to the effort. Therefore, the business would be subject 
to division as marital property. Even though the stock ownership was solely in 
Mr. McCourt’s name, the default rules of family law determine the disposition 
of marital assets in a divorce. However, shortly after acquiring the Dodgers, the 
couple had entered into a marital property agreement and its enforceability 
controlled what the Los Angeles Times called “the central issue in the couple’s 
divorce: Does he own the team or do they own it jointly?”225 
Ms. McCourt claimed that she signed the agreement without reading it, and 
that she believed the purpose of dividing assets was to separate the couple’s 
business assets from their homes and other personal property.226 In other words, 
she alleged that the goal was to protect the family’s assets from possible 
creditors, not to allocate marital property in the event of a divorce. Mr. McCourt 
contended that Ms. McCourt wanted to insulate herself from the risks associated 
with the Dodgers—it had been losing $50 million a year at the time of the 
McCourt investment, and Mr. McCourt had agreed to indemnify Major League 
Baseball for all losses going forward—and that the agreement accomplished its 
purpose.227 
In December 2010, the court threw out the marital property agreement, in 
large part because the lawyer representing both parties had altered the provision 
                                                                                                                       
2010, 4:02 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/08/jamie-mccourt-wanted-to-
renege-on-post-marital-agreement-involving-dodgers-because-it-would-impinge-.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9CSE-RX6V. 
 224  Id. 
 225  Carlos Lozano & Bill Shaikin, McCourt Divorce Trial Opens, L.A. TIMES  (Aug. 30, 
2010, 9:03 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/08/mccourt-divorce-trial-
opens.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S9TP-SFD4. 
 226  Shaikin, supra note 223 (“Jamie McCourt has maintained she never would have 
knowingly signed away her right to the Dodgers. She says she signed the agreement without 
reading it, trusting her husband when he said the document was designed to protect the 
couple’s homes from creditors.”). 
 227  Id. (“Frank McCourt says the document did exactly what he said it did and that 
Jamie McCourt wanted it that way, that she insisted upon such an agreement so as not to risk 
losing the homes if the McCourts failed to reverse the Dodgers’ financial losses.”). As to the 
public statements regarding joint ownership, he testified at trial “that a news release 
identifying himself and his wife as owners of the Dodgers was meant to emphasize that 
family ownership had returned to the team after six years under the corporate stewardship of 
Fox Entertainment Group.”  Bill Shaikin, Frank McCourt Says Wife Could Not Own 
Dodgers and Retain Homes [Updated], L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2010, 3:12 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/09/frank-mccourt-says-wife-could-not-own-
dodgers-and-retain-homes.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NGT3-YNUU. 
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at issue without notifying either party.228 The court could not conclude whether 
either version of the agreement accurately reflected the parties’ intentions. 
Accordingly, under the default rules of divorce, which now applied, Ms. 
McCourt was able to claim half-ownership of the Dodgers. In the end, Mr. 
McCourt had no choice but to sell his interest in the Dodgers in order to fund 
the divorce settlement.229 
The narrow point is that poorly drafted agreements can have serious 
consequences. More broadly, though, the lesson to be drawn from the 
experience of the Swigs and the McCourts is that family-business planning 
cannot rest at the formal boundaries of the firm but encompasses and organizes 
a wider set of “‘[c]onnected contracts[,]’ [which] may be thought of as 
shorthand for a fluid, nonlinear, nonhierarchical set of interactions and 
interrelationships.”230 Put plainly, no family-business plan is complete unless it 
takes into account possible disruptions of family relationships, including 
divorce.231  Marital agreements that address the status of business assets are, 
therefore, an important part of the nexus of family-business contracts. 
2. Family Trusts 
Trust instruments that control family-business assets also fall within the 
contractual nexus, because the trust agreement defines the trustee’s authority as 
business manager.232 Any characterization of the family business that failed to 
                                                                                                                       
 228  The lawyer had the parties sign a version of the agreement that included the Dodgers 
as marital property. He later substituted what he claimed was the correct language without 
notifying the parties. Bill Shaikin, McCourt Divorce: Damaging Admission from Lawyer 
who Negotiated Dodgers Agreement, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:30 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/09/jamie-mccourt-wins-damaging-admission-
from-lawyer-who-negotiated-dodgers-ownership-agreement.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RMW4-DLFS. 
 229  See Shaikin, supra note 119. 
 230  Gulati et al., supra note 15, at 894. 
 231  In general, there are strong reasons to prefer private ordering concerning the 
consequences of a divorce to a state-imposed solution. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 
956–57 (1979) (“[A] negotiated agreement allows the parties to avoid the risks and 
uncertainties of litigation, which may involve all-or-nothing consequences . . . [and] a 
consensual solution is by definition more likely to be consistent with the preferences of each 
spouse, and acceptable over time, than would a result imposed by a court.”). 
 232  In one case, for instance, the settlor “‘treated [the trust] and [the corporation] as a 
coordinated operation . . . intend[ing] the Trustees to work with and through the 
[corporation] . . . to make coordinated investments and gain control of businesses.’” Bartlett 
v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 8 (N.H. 1986) (quoting master’s report). Families often use trusts to 
effectuate the transfer of property and other assets, including family-owned businesses. See 
Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215, 217 
(2011); see also John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument 
of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1997) (“The trust originated at the end of the Middle 
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acknowledge the controlling trust would be a sterile and pointless exercise.233 
Rather, when trust law overlaps with business-organization law, the vital 
question is whether there is some appropriate mechanism for coordinating the 
parties’ rights and obligations.234 
For example, the applicable fiduciary standards differ significantly.235 
Unless modified, the default duty of loyalty owed by a trustee requires 
disgorgement of all profits, even if the dealings were fair.236 A controlling 
shareholder, by contrast, is entitled to benefit from the share ownership as long 
as any self-interested transactions are fair to the other shareholders.237 The 
trustee who manages a trust-controlled business appears to owe fiduciary duties 
in both capacities.  
The inconsistency of fiduciary obligations becomes especially problematic 
when a family member is empowered as trustee to manage a family business for 
the benefit of other members of the family.238 This arrangement involves a plain 
conflict of interest if the trustee is a beneficiary of the trust or a controlling 
shareholder of the family business.239 For a recent example, consider Rupert 
Murdoch’s estate plan for transferring control of his multi-billion dollar stake in 
News Corp, the company he founded, to his children. A principal means to that 
end includes, reportedly, a family trust to be run by the children from his first 
two marriages for their own benefit and the benefit of the children of his third 
marriage.240 
                                                                                                                       
Ages as a means of transferring wealth within the family, and the trust remains our 
characteristic device for organizing intergenerational wealth transmission . . . .”). 
 233  See Frank T. Becker, Control of Trust-Held Companies by Trustees, 19 J. CORP. L. 
41, 41 (1993) (“Trusts often hold sufficient voting interest in business entities to effectively 
control them.”). 
 234  See Boxx, supra note 134, at 235–36. 
 235  The duties may also apply to different parties. See Boxx, supra note 134, at 235 
(noting “complex dilemma” when trustee “must act both as corporate fiduciary, running the 
business in the best interests of all the stakeholders in the business, and as trustee to her 
sibling, owing undivided loyalty to this one shareholder”). 
 236  See Langbein, supra note 45, at 656 (“The trustee who deals with trust property for 
the trustee’s own account is liable to disgorge the profits to the trust even if the trustee paid 
fair value for the property.”). 
 237  See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). 
 238  See Boxx, supra note 134, at 233 (noting that trusts are a “popular solution” to the 
problem posed by multiple heirs, not all of whom are capable or interested in assuming a 
leadership position in the family business). 
 239  See id. 
 240  According to news accounts, Mr. Murdoch’s disclosure of the unequal control 
arrangement during a television interview several years ago nearly caused the breakup of his 
third marriage. See Peter Lattman & Amy Chozick, Wendi Murdoch Hires a New Lawyer, 
Suggesting a Divorce May Turn Messy, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, at B3 (“The slip almost 
created a separation, and prompted Mrs. Murdoch to negotiate more favorable terms for her 
daughters, according to people close to the couple.”). Mr. Murdoch has now initiated divorce 
proceedings seeking to end the marriage, and commentators speculate that any private 
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Even for families that lack the complexity of the Murdoch clan, the 
trustee’s role remains an issue. As one commentator explains: 
 
Low-grade conflicts of interest are especially endemic in family trusteeships. 
We see constantly in real-world practice some version of the case in which my 
father names me trustee for my mother for life, remainder to a group including 
me, with a power in the trustee to invade the corpus of the trust for the benefit 
of my mother in the event the life interest becomes inadequate for her comfort 
and support. My father has insisted on choosing a conflict-tainted trustee, 
making the judgment that I am to be trusted not to pauperize my mother to 
enrich myself. These situations are especially dangerous when the trust is given 
a controlling interest in a close corporation, and I am an officer of that firm.241 
 
From the standpoint of the family member who is appointed trustee, the 
challenge is to discharge the trustee’s obligations faithfully while also sharing in 
the benefits of the family business, both as beneficiary of the trust and as a 
controlling shareholder.242 
The contractual conception of the firm can help to clarify the trustee’s role 
by focusing attention on the family-business bargain in its entirety.243 Thus, 
whether or not the settlor defines the trustee’s obligations explicitly, those 
obligations should be interpreted according to the overall context: 
If he is well counseled, my father spells out broad authority for me as trustee, 
expressly trumping the default standards of the duty of loyalty. But when he 
neglects that step, contractarian analysis encourages us to look at the real 
nature of the trust deal, that is, what he and I understood, or what we would 
have understood about the purposes of the trust and the standard for my 
trusteeship. 244 
                                                                                                                       
settlement will involve the terms of the family trust arrangement, as his third wife will 
follow legal counsel and seek more solid protection for her children. Id. 
 241  See Langbein, supra note 45, at 667. 
 242  See Boxx, supra note 134, at 235 (noting that the “[d]uties of a corporate fiduciary 
are much more lenient than that of a trustee”). 
 243  See Langbein, supra note 45, at 630 (“In fields ranging from corporations and 
partnership, to landlord and tenant, to servitudes, to the law of marriage, scholars have come 
to understand our legal rules as resting mainly on imputed bargains that are susceptible to 
alteration by actual bargains.”). Context should also factor into the interpretation: “Family 
and personal trustees often have interests adverse to the trust. The settlor’s determination to 
ask these conflicted persons to serve bears materially on the standard of fiduciary duty that 
the trust deal embodies.”  Id. at 666. 
 244  Id. at 667; see also Bartlett v. Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 11 (N.H. 1986) (applying 
corporate business-judgment rule deference rather than enhanced scrutiny under trust law’s 
prudent-investor rule: “[w]here, as in this case, a trust instrument allows the trustees to 
operate trust-controlled corporations, the trustees have wide discretion in running the 
corporate enterprises”). 
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Such assessments of intent require a “sympathetic reading of the [trust 
instrument] as an entirety and in view of all the facts and circumstances under 
which the provisions . . . were framed.”245 
Trust agreements can also align the goals of the business organization with 
the values of the family owners. For example, the Green family that owns 
Hobby Lobby operates it “through a management trust (of which each Green is 
a trustee), . . . governed by religious principles.”246 Although Hobby Lobby is a 
for-profit business, the trust instrument designates a religious purpose—“to 
create, support, and leverage the efforts of Christian ministries”—and every 
beneficiary is required to affirm that religious purpose as a condition of 
membership in the trust.247 By imposing religious conditions in the context of a 
family transfer of wealth, rather than as part of the governance structure of the 
underlying business, the Green family seeks to avoid the possibility that its 
religious mission might be stymied someday by a dissenting shareholder 
insistent upon the pursuit of profits.248 
It might be objected that trusts are not part of the contractual nexus because 
“a trust is ‘essentially a gift, projected on the plane of time and so subjected to a 
management regime.’”249 However, even if the trust organizes a transfer of 
property,250 the rules by which the trust operates are set by mutual agreement 
between the settlor and the trustee—a relationship that resembles a third-party 
                                                                                                                       
 245  In re Estate of Winston, 205 A.D.2d 922, 923 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (analyzing a trust created by a will). According to one 
commentator, the “answer cannot be as simple as choosing one standard over the other but 
rather requires fashioning a distinct standard that both protects the beneficiary and allows 
sufficient management autonomy to allow the business to prosper.”  Boxx, supra note 134, 
at 236. 
 246  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 247  Id. Each Green family member is bound to this mission, which encompasses Hobby 
Lobby, by a required signature joining a “Trust Commitment.”  Id. The use of a trust to 
require religious commitments is not an aberration. In another case, for instance, a son 
“transferred the control of his stock in the family corporations to his father in trust, a trust 
[that the son] could revoke without his father’s consent only if he married a Jewish woman.”  
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 553 (N.C. 1983). 
 248  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
(2003) (stating that the “donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by 
law”). For discussion of the importance of shareholder unanimity, see Hall & Means, supra 
note 82, at 160 n.57 (distinguishing possible free-exercise interests of privately held 
corporations from public corporations in which shareholder unanimity is impossible: “Given 
the diverse corporate congregation, the duty to maximize profits may be the only 
overarching tenet of the faith”). 
 249  Gallanis, supra note 232, at 217. To effectuate the gift over time, “[l]egal title to the 
trust assets is transferred from the settlor to the trustee; equitable title is transferred from the 
settlor to the trust’s beneficiaries.” Id. 
 250  Traditionally, the trust has been viewed as a means of conveying property. See 
Langbein, supra note 45, at 644 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b 
(1959)). Professor Langbein further contends that “our doctrinal account of the trust remains 
inimical to recognizing the contractarian basis of the trust.” Id.  
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beneficiary contract in that it is a voluntary, legally-enforceable commitment 
undertaken for the benefit of another party.251 In short, “trusts are contracts.”252 
More important, whether trusts ought to be classified as property or contract in 
some hypothetical, linnaean schema,253 the trustee’s role is contractual within 
the meaning of the nexus-of-contract theory because it is an economic 
relationship defined by voluntary agreement.  
3. Inheritance Contracts 
A contractual approach to family business can also account for promises to 
convey wealth, including family-business assets, in exchange for assistance 
during the testator’s lifetime.254 The details vary, but in each case “the aging 
person makes the . . . promise: ‘Take care of me, and someday all this will be 
yours.’”255 Notwithstanding the principle of testamentary freedom, as well as 
the conventional belief that relatives ought to provide services to one another 
without compensation, courts have generally recognized that inheritances can 
be the subject of contract.256 
Thus, private ordering regarding the transfer of family wealth can establish 
the functional equivalent of a work-to-own employment agreement. For 
instance, in Wright v. Trask, a grandfather promised to leave his ranch and 
cattle in exchange for his grandson’s management of the ranch.257 As the older 
man’s health declined, his desire to retain control of the ranch did not, and the 
relationship “became so strained” that the grandfather disinherited his grandson 
and took away his managerial rights.258 The grandson sought specific 
                                                                                                                       
 251  Although the trust provides a mechanism for transferring property from a settlor to 
certain beneficiaries, “[t]he distinguishing feature of the trust is . . . the trust deal that defines 
the powers and responsibilities of the trustee in managing the property.” Id. at 627. Whether 
the trust specifies particular obligations or relies upon default rules, “the deal between settlor 
and trustee is functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary 
contract.” Id. 
 252  Id. 
 253  See id. at 628 (arguing that the contractual features of trust law involve more “than 
mere labeling” and that “greater attention to the contractarian character of the trust would 
improve outcomes”). 
 254  See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY 
OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012) (exploring the legal and emotional realities of 
conveying wealth to family members upon old age). 
 255  Dubler, supra note 14, at 2293–94. Bargains involving wills can be struck with non-
family members, see, e.g., Bock v. Brody, 870 P.2d 530, 532 (Colo. App. 1993), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 897 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1995) (enforcing promise made regarding transfer of 
ownership via will to keep Bock employed in Brody’s stock brokerage firm), but they are 
more typical in a family context. 
 256  Even when inheritance contracts are not in writing, many jurisdictions allow partial 
performance to establish clear and convincing evidence. See HARTOG, supra note 254, at 
204. 
 257  Wright v. Trask, 495 S.E.2d 222, 224 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).  
 258  Id. at 225. 
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performance of an oral agreement, and the trial court required the grandfather to 
execute a will leaving the ranch to the grandson and enjoined him from taking 
any steps to reduce value of the ranch.259 
Other courts have reached similar results. In Shepherd v. Mazzetti, the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a grant of specific performance of a father’s 
oral promise to convey real estate to his son.260 Likewise, a New York appellate 
court held that a son’s decision to “remain as the manager of the family 
business . . . [and] to forego other professional opportunities in reliance upon 
[his mother’s] promise constituted sufficient consideration for purposes of 
imposing a constructive trust.”261 In each case, the bargained-for, economic 
aspects of the parties’ relationship gave rise to an enforceable obligation even 
though the existence of family connections might otherwise have suggested an 
alternative explanation for one-sided labor arrangements. 
The recognition that inheritance contracts can cement business relationships 
supports the descriptive claim that family businesses include family bargains. 
However, in interpreting such bargains, courts seem to treat intimacy as a 
polluting factor. For instance, had the court in Wright v. Trask concluded that 
the grandson’s services were motivated in substantial part by a sense of family 
obligation, that finding would have derailed the grandson’s legal claim to the 
family business. Understandably, courts must separate enforceable obligations 
from gratuitous undertakings, but it does not aid the analysis to insist upon a 
false category distinction—business or family, not both.  
Under existing law, though, lawyers representing family members in 
inheritance-contracts cases have reason to guide their clients to “repress 
much . . . emotional complexity” in order to fall on the correct side of the 
category distinction: “It would be the lawyer’s job to identify contractual 
motivations and to make them appear as the dominant and real ones, those that 
had transformed lives.”262 And yet, in many cases, the attention devoted to the 
older generation is motivated by love as well as rational calculation.263 To 
                                                                                                                       
 259  Even though the agreement was oral, the part performance evidenced by prior wills 
devising the ranch to Wright provided sufficient evidence of the terms. Id. at 228 (citing 
McLauchlin v. Gressette, 79 S.E.2d 149, 158–59 (S.C. 1953) (“‘[N]otwithstanding the 
statute of frauds, the specific performance of such a contract (to devise real property, 
interpolated) may be enforced in equity, where there has been part performance of the 
contract by the party seeking relief.’”)). An appellate court affirmed, holding that “Trask and 
Wright entered into an oral contract to make a will . . . [and that] Trask breached the contract 
by executing a new will, which did not leave the ranch, the cattle, and the equipment to 
Wright.”  Id. at 229. 
 260  Shepherd v. Mazzetti, 545 A.2d 621, 622 (Del. 1988). 
 261  In re Urdang, 758 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126–27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); see also Quadrozzi 
v. Estate of Quadrozzi, 952 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (imposing constructive 
trust to protect brother’s interest in family business). 
 262  HARTOG, supra note 254, at 204. 
 263  See Dubler, supra note 14, at 2307 (noting that in claims for payment, asserted when 
a deceased family member failed to convey property as promised, “legal incentives 
sometimes actually disincentivized any mention of love”). In its zeal for order, “law cannot 
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acknowledge this reality—the overlapping values of business and family—
ought not undercut the force of the disinherited plaintiff’s grievance.264 
Contractual choices made by family members regarding a family-owned 
business are embedded in a broader family context of trust and reciprocity.265 
V. FAMILY-BUSINESS DEFAULTS 
This Part contends that greater appreciation of the context for family-
business bargains would spur the development of default rules and interpretive 
principles consistent with the parties’ business and family relationships. 
Although this is not the place to give full consideration to the appropriate role 
of default rules within a contractarian framework,266 or to delineate a 
comprehensive law of family business, three examples will suffice to illustrate 
the point: first, that existing limitations on exit rights in business statutes 
facilitate estate planning; second, that oral agreements and implicit 
understandings among family members will often provide the best evidence of 
family-business bargains; and, third, that equity should play a consistent role in 
evaluating bargains across doctrinal categories. 
A. Exit Rights 
In closely held businesses, family-owned or not, minority investors are 
vulnerable to mistreatment at the hands of the majority.267 Unless they have 
bargained for veto rights, board representation, or other checks on majority 
power, the practical ability of minority investors to earn a return on their 
investment depends upon the majority’s decisions regarding dividends, 
employment, and other distributions of assets. The minority’s vulnerability is 
                                                                                                                       
quite figure out what to do with the role that love should play in people’s familial choices 
and commitments.”  Id. at 2306. 
 264  See HARTOG, supra note 254, at 204 (“They were in the lawyer’s office and willing 
to go to court because they believed they had been cheated . . . . But for promises made, they 
would have gotten better jobs, learned trades, moved to Montana, not become a drunk, and 
had happier marriages. They knew . . . that taking care of elderly people had been a 
distraction at best from the lives they were supposed to lead.”). 
 265  See Means, supra note 3, at 1189 (“In a family business . . . the values associated 
with family life must coexist with the values of the marketplace.”) (citing MANFRED F.R. 
KETS DE VRIES ET AL., FAMILY BUSINESS ON THE COUCH: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 
(2007)). 
 266  See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 
121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2034–35 (2012); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. 
Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1999); Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, 
supra note 16, at 87. 
 267  See Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 67, at 1217. Many classic cases 
of shareholder oppression involve family-owned businesses. See GRANT GORDON & NIGEL 
NICHOLSON, FAMILY WARS: CLASSIC CONFLICTS IN FAMILY BUSINESS AND HOW TO DEAL 
WITH THEM 3–4, 10 (2008).  
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exacerbated if the business-entity form provides no right of exit.268 Thus, unless 
investors need assurances regarding the stability of their capital investment,269 
limited exit rights are puzzling from an internal governance perspective.270 
Yet, as a matter of tax law, vulnerability has value because it enables a 
family to transmit wealth between generations while claiming a substantial 
reduction in value for lack of control and lack of marketability.271 Family 
members who receive shares of a business from loved ones as a gift may have 
less reason to worry about oppression—and, in any case, the shares do not 
represent an investment bargain. In order to accommodate family tax planning 
through closely held businesses, most jurisdictions restrict exit rights in limited 
partnerships, LLCs, and trusts.272 Indeed, default LLC rules that once provided 
for easy exit were altered to suit the needs of family businesses.273 
The default no-exit rule can be defended on efficiency grounds, even if it 
turns out that most closely held businesses would be well advised to adopt more 
liberal exit rules. Crucially, the Internal Revenue Code calculates discounts for 
lack of control and marketability based upon the language of the business 
statute and may disregard private ordering that cuts back on exit rights that the 
statute would otherwise provide.274 Business owners can include exit provisions 
at relatively low cost; however, families that want the lock-in rule for tax 
                                                                                                                       
 268  See Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 67, at 1217. 
 269  See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-
Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 915 
(1999) (arguing that “the close corporation form is best suited to companies that require 
extensive investments in match assets. In such cases, the close corporation acts as an 
incubator and the lock-in is a benefit, not a cost.”). 
 270  See Ribstein, supra note 182, at 772 (“[R]estricting exit may involve significant 
costs in closely held firms by subjecting members who have neither management power nor 
exit rights to potential oppression by the managers and controlling owners.”); J.A.C. 
Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory 
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (1977). 
 271  See supra Part III.D. 
 272  See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for 
Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 360–61 
(2005); Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, III, Family Limited Partnerships: Decanting 
Family Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 128 (1995).  
 273  See RIBSTEIN, supra note 63, at 179–80. 
 274  See Ribstein, supra note 182, at 771 (“Family members cannot avoid receiving full 
market value simply by a partnership agreement provision restricting transfers because only 
state statutory restrictions matter under the IRC.”) (citing I.R.C. § 2704(b)(1) (2000)); 
HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, 2 TAX PLANNING FOR FAMILY WEALTH TRANSFERS DURING LIFE: 
ANALYSIS WITH FORMS ¶ 10.03[2][b][i] (5th ed. 2013) (noting that Section 2704(b) ignores 
“limitations on the ability to liquidate the partnership that are more restrictive than those 
generally extant under applicable state law” if the limitations “will lapse or if the transferor 
or his or her family can remove [the limitations] after the transfer”). 
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planning are much better off relying on a statutory default rule.275 Thus, an opt-
out approach helps all business investors to maximize the value of their 
investment.276 
A possible compromise position—tailoring the no-exit defaults more 
narrowly to qualifying family businesses that have elected to be treated as such 
under special statutory provisions277—would not necessarily lead to better 
outcomes in the aggregate.278 First, while creating a separate set of statutory 
provisions for family businesses has some appeal, given the distinctive 
characteristics canvassed in this Article, it would also require a more precise 
articulation of which businesses qualify, and any defined boundary would be 
both under- and over-inclusive. Unlike a fixed statutory definition, the 
contractual approach has enough flexibility to respond to family-controlled 
businesses with widely varying features. 
Second, even if it were possible to identify “qualifying” family businesses 
in a satisfactory manner, those businesses would then have to elect the special 
family coverage. That is, if investors in non-family businesses behave 
irrationally by failing to include exit rights, it seems likely that family-business 
owners will make similar mistakes. For a separate family-business designation 
to serve its purpose, we must be able to assume that family owners will, in fact, 
elect that status when appropriate.279 Also, although the lock-in rule applies to 
                                                                                                                       
 275  See ZARITSKY, supra note 274, at ¶ 10.03[2][b][i] (noting that the Internal Revenue 
Code “causes the partnership interest to be valued without regard to the restrictions on 
liquidation contained in the partnership agreement”). 
 276  Perhaps this disparity explains why business statutes accommodate family interests 
in this one respect and not in others. Of course, the need for a business entity with restricted 
exit features does not necessarily mean that all business organizations should contain that 
feature. See Larry E. Ribstein, The New Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 325, 340 (1997) (arguing that “at least one type of statute should be kept ‘safe’ for non-
family firms that do not have tax reasons to restrict member exit”). 
 277  See Moll, supra note 116, at 974 (“[E]ven if family-business tax concerns are 
viewed . . . as issues of paramount importance, the elimination of default exit rights in all of 
a particular business structure seems unnecessarily overbroad.”). 
 278  Note that the argument in text assumes that tax benefits and avoidance of 
governance problems are goods of roughly equal value. If the tax benefits for lack of control 
and marketability provide less value to family owners than the commensurate harm suffered 
in oppression cases, then the efficiency argument regarding opt-out provisions might be 
outweighed by the impetus to mitigate shareholder oppression whenever possible. An 
analysis of the issue, however, would turn on empirical data regarding harm to minority 
investors, including the causal role of exit provisions, as well as normative assessments of 
the social value of tax deductions, or lack thereof. 
 279  This may be a reasonable assumption because sophisticated tax planning requires 
expert advisers, and those advisers ought to be able to counsel family owners regarding 
available choices of business entity form. However, it also seems likely that some family 
businesses would be reluctant to make an election that segregates them from other 
businesses—a problem that has limited the usefulness of optional supplements to corporate 
codes designed to address the needs of close corporations. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 158(a) (West 2012) (defining “close corporation” as “a corporation . . . whose articles 
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family and non-family businesses alike, family businesses are a significant 
percentage of all businesses.280 Accordingly, while it is true that only a subset 
of businesses can take advantage of the tax benefit, that number is far from 
inconsequential.281 
In any event, whether no-exit rules can or should be tailored to family 
businesses, the risk of abuse of control exists even in those family businesses 
that have the most to gain from favorable tax treatment. Thus, the selection of 
an appropriate statutory default rule regarding exit rights should be coupled 
with consideration of the judicial role: when asked to adjudicate a claim of 
oppression in a closely held business with no bargained-for exit rights, a court 
could conclude that capital lock-in default must have been important to the 
investors, or they would have bargained around it.282 
However, in family businesses—at least those that fall outside the realm of 
the high-technology driven, entrepreneurial startup—an explanation based upon 
the supposed desirability of capital lock-in for business purposes is generally 
unpersuasive.283 Rather, tax considerations supply the obvious reason for 
retaining the no-exit rule. While the existence of a tax-driven rationale does not 
mean that courts should provide, after the fact, a right that the parties chose to 
exclude, neither should courts reinforce the no-exit rule by inventing an 
implausible rationale for it. Instead, the absence of a statutory exit right should 
feature only as background that explains the majority’s power; whether the 
majority has abused its power is a separate matter to be resolved according to a 
jurisdiction’s shareholder-oppression law. 
                                                                                                                       
contain . . . a provision that all of the corporation’s issued shares . . . shall be held of record 
by not more than” thirty-five persons); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341–356 (2014) (offering 
“special provisions” in subchapter for qualifying close corporations that make the election). 
 280  See DRAKE, supra note 1, at 274. 
 281  The objection that “policymakers should resist allowing the needs of a subset of 
business owners to dictate important default rules that apply well beyond that subset,” Moll, 
supra note 116, at 973, has less force if the subset is also a majority. Of course, not all 
family businesses have assets that merit sophisticated tax planning, and ascertaining the true 
percentage would be relevant to assessing the utility of imposing a no-exit default rule for all 
closely held businesses. 
 282  See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 269, at 920 (discussing the needs of a high-
tech startup company: “If participants can trigger dissolution at will, they will be unwilling, 
ex ante, to make investments in match for fear that, ex post, they will be held up.”). 
 283  However, if business owners anticipate a messy inheritance dispute, they may prefer 
a locked-in structure that avoids the dissipation of capital. For instance, I.M. Singer & 
Company incorporated in the late 1800s, not to raise capital or limit shareholder liability, but 
because it came to light that one of the two principals, Mr. Singer, had many children by 
several women. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved 
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 446 (2003) 
(“Singer’s heirs, however many of them there might be, would all have some legal claim to 
some share of the business, and it would probably require years of court battles to establish 
who was to get what.”). After incorporation, “[h]eirs could be given equity shares in the 
business out of Singer’s estate without disturbing or breaking up the assets and governance 
structure of the business.”  Id. 
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B. Oral and Implied Agreements 
The nexus of contracts that defines a family business includes the parties’ 
various written and unwritten contracts, connections, and understandings, all of 
which bear upon the parties’ expectations. Accordingly, unless the parties have 
a written agreement that excludes collateral provisions and expressly requires 
that modifications be in writing, evidence of oral agreements and implicit 
understandings among family-business participants should be admissible. While 
an economically rational actor negotiating at arm’s-length might insist upon 
reducing important terms to writing, the participants in a closely held business, 
especially one that is family-owned, are unlikely to pay scrupulous attention to 
niceties of documentation. 
A jurisdictional split concerning the enforceability of oral LLC agreements 
highlights the importance of the issue. Notwithstanding the fact that participants 
often rely upon unwritten understandings, some jurisdictions require LLCs to 
have a written operating agreement.284 For instance, New York provides that 
“the members of a limited liability company shall adopt a written operating 
agreement” and makes no provision for unwritten obligations.285 In the absence 
of a written agreement, New York courts abandon the effort to understand the 
parties’ actual bargain and resort instead to a statutory default operating 
agreement.286 
Yet, the statutory default rules applicable to all LLCs describe a 
hypothetical bargain among generic investors and will miss many of the 
important features of family businesses. Not only will the default rules depart 
from the parties’ intentions in significant respects, but a retreat to false 
simplicity may not even save judicial resources. If a jurisdiction’s LLC law 
lacks the conceptual resources to address the parties’ comprehensive bargain, 
the excluded elements might be raised in collateral proceedings or causes of 
action, such as when a spouse alleges an economic partnership that enfolds the 
assets of the business entity,287 or a trust beneficiary alleges that the fiduciary 
obligations of trust administration supersede the discretion that a business 
                                                                                                                       
 284  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27(b)(1) (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0102(16) 
(2014). 
 285  N.Y. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW § 417(a) (McKinney1996); see also Peter 
Mahler, The Oral LLC Agreement: Boon or Bane?, N.Y. BUS. DIVORCE (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2014/02/articles/llcs/laurel-hill/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DZJ5-2WT7 (“My own view, perhaps reflecting my New York home pride, 
favors the relative certainty provided by the judicially imposed, statutory operating 
agreement that comes into play when the parties fail to enter into a written agreement.”). 
 286  In re Spires, 778 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“When there is no written 
Operating Agreement, these statutory default provisions become the terms, conditions, and 
requirements for the conduct of the members for the operation of the limited liability 
company.”). 
 287  See Penley v. Penley, 332 S.E.2d 51, 63–64 (N.C. 1985). 
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manager might otherwise have. Business statutes should, instead, facilitate 
coherent evaluation of the parties’ mutual expectations. 
In Delaware, and a majority of jurisdictions, the LLC operating agreement 
is more helpfully defined to include “any agreement . . . written, oral or implied, 
of the member or members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and 
the conduct of its business.”288 Even though this more permissive approach can 
generate litigation and uncertainty, the alternative would effectively exclude 
many family-business bargains, thereby violating the parties’ own 
expectations.289 In other words, predictability at the adjudication stage should 
not be achieved by undermining settled expectations crucial to the overall 
business relationship. Instead, courts can protect against abuse by requiring 
adequate evidence to establish the alleged terms of an oral or implied 
agreement.  
C. Equity’s Role 
In order to develop a coherent set of rules for family businesses, courts 
invoking the equitable dimension of family law should note a corresponding 
interest in business predictability. Without forcing all contracts into a single 
template, equitable considerations should be applied more even-handedly to 
reduce the chance for confusion or manipulation. For instance, if family courts 
reviewing marital agreements apply a high degree of scrutiny in order to 
achieve an equitable result, ex post,290 that judicial scrutiny can produce 
unintended consequences within a family business involving overlapping 
obligations. The contracts in a nexus are contingent upon one another; 
constricting certain options may only change the overall shape of the nexus.291 
                                                                                                                       
 288  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (2014). The work of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which captures the majority view, provides 
similarly that an operating agreement can be “oral, in a record, implied, or in any 
combination thereof . . . .”  REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, § 102(13), 6B U.L.A. 429 
(2006). 
 289  In general, then, “[t]he benefits of certainty must be balanced against the potential 
costs of frustrating the parties’ intent by refusing to enforce oral agreements, particularly in 
informal firms.” Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 35, 45 (2008). Of course, if one refuses to 
accommodate informality, it is possible to conclude that no expectation can be reasonable 
unless expressed in a form that meets minimum statutory requirements. 
 290  See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. 
L. REV. 65, 75 (1998) (stating that many jurisdictions use a strict unconscionability review to 
police the fairness of marital bargains). 
 291  See Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 233, 244 (1994) (noting original definition of contingent, from the Latin 
contingentem, means “touching together or on all sides”) (citing III THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 825 (2d ed. 1989)). As one scholar observes, restrictions on premarital 
agreements could also affect the willingness of individuals to enter into marriages in the first 
place. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital 
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Accordingly, if a parent doubts that a child’s marital agreement will be 
enforceable, the parent can exclude the child from any direct business 
ownership and rely on generation-skipping trusts rather than risk the dissipation 
of family-business assets in a divorce.292 
Divergence in the scrutiny of family and business contracts may have an 
historical explanation. Until fairly recently, for instance, courts rejected the idea 
of marital agreements.293 Even today, a prenuptial bargain in some jurisdictions 
will be subject to enhanced scrutiny, and a judge can set aside the bargain as 
coercive if the spouse in a superior bargaining position failed to disclose 
material information, took advantage of his (or, more rarely, her) position, or if 
enforcement of the bargain as written would produce a result beyond the 
parties’ contemplation at the time it was entered.  
By contrast, although shareholder bargains were also considered void at one 
time, corporate law now permits shareholders wide freedom to modify the rules 
to suit their interests. The same principle of contractual freedom applies 
generally to other types of business organization. As long as the terms are clear, 
a party to the bargain will be hard pressed to persuade a court to rewrite or 
disregard it. This remains true even if, viewed after the fact, the agreement leads 
to a one-sided outcome based upon events that could not easily have been 
anticipated at the time the agreement was signed. 
The Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act, adopted in some form 
in about half the states, splits the difference between these positions in a way 
that could be useful for family businesses.294 The Act creates a presumption of 
enforceability and places the burden on the objecting party to show that the 
                                                                                                                       
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 169–70 
(1998). 
 292  Nor is this a fanciful scenario. In a recent high-profile divorce case involving a 
Canadian family business, the court threw out a postnuptial agreement that was drafted by 
the founder for the signature of his daughter-in-law in order “to pass on his wealth through 
generations of his bloodline, not fragmented by marital breakups.”  Joseph Brean, ‘Over-
Reaching’ Marriage Contracts: McCain Divorce Case Shows Pitfalls of Keeping Fortune in 
the Family, NAT’L POST (Jan. 13, 2013, 9:17 PM), 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/01/13/over-reaching-marriage-contracts-mccain-divorce-
case-shows-pitfalls-of-keeping-fortune-in-the-family/, archived at http://perma.cc/3SCM-
978U (quoting affidavit of Michael McCain). In exchange for a payment of $300,000 and a 
right to claim up to $7 million and the marital home, the daughter-in-law gave up her right to 
treat the full value of her husband’s interest in the family business as marital property. Id. 
Further, as both husband and wife acknowledged, the father agreed not to “structure his 
estate planning and trusts to ensure that the wealth would skip a generation from us to our 
children.” Id. Despite her prior waiver, the wife was entitled to support payments calculated 
to include the value of the husband’s stake in the business. Id.  
 293  UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, prefatory note, 9C U.L.A. 12–14 
(Supp. 2014) (“Forty years ago, state courts generally refused to enforce premarital 
agreements that altered the parties’ right at divorce, on the basis that such agreements were 
attempts to alter the terms of a status (marriage) or because they had the effect of 
encouraging divorce . . . .”). 
 294  Id. 
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agreement was the product of duress, undue influence, or other bargaining 
defect.295 However, the Act also provides a clear mechanism for raising such 
challenges and identifies important factors, including aspects of procedural due 
process.296 Further, because a “significant minority of states authorizes some 
form of fairness review based on the parties’ circumstances at the time the 
agreement is to be enforced, [the uniform act] offers the option of” adding a 
“substantial hardship” provision.297 Thus, the Act recognizes the importance of 
contract without ignoring the context of family relationships that may make 
arm’s-length bargaining more difficult. 
The consistency that the Act aims to achieve across marital agreements 
could be extended to other kinds of agreements among family members—
particularly, shareholder agreements and similar business arrangements.298 In 
family businesses, many of the same concerns about power and information 
disparities apply to business dealings, and the bargains are often between the 
same individuals. Thus, it would be helpful for courts to operate from a 
common set of interpretive principles. All bargains should come with a 
presumption of enforceability. However, to the extent courts take into account 
gross unfairness in substantive terms, disparate bargaining positions, or other 
equitable considerations, the equitable analysis properly applies to business and 
family bargains alike. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In a family business, the competing claims of business law and family law 
can leave a residue of doubt, even when the parties have engaged in private 
ordering. If a dispute arises, courts must interpret and enforce the parties’ 
agreements concerning their business and family obligations. The task 
presupposes some common principles for aligning, or at least prioritizing the 
parties’ contractual choices.  Absent clear interpretive guidance, court decisions 
may vary even in cases with similar facts. Judicial inconsistency interferes with 
rational business planning and invites arbitrage across doctrinal categories by 
sophisticated parties.299 
                                                                                                                       
 295  Id. (“The general approach of this act is that parties should be free, within broad 
limits, to choose the financial terms of their marriage.”). 
 296  Id. § 9(a) (stating that a “marital agreement is unenforceable if a party against whom 
enforcement is sought proves” duress, lack of access to independent legal counsel, or lack of 
“adequate financial disclosure”). 
 297  Id. prefatory note. 
 298  Further, the Act contemplates that “[w]hile most . . . marital agreements will be 
stand-alone documents, a fragment of a writing that deals primarily with other topics could 
also constitute a . . . marital agreement . . . .” Id. § 2 cmt.; cf. supra note 129 (discussing 
segregation of shareholder and marital agreements in Colclasure v. Colclasure, 295 P.3d 
1123 (Okla. 2012)). 
 299  See, e.g., Thomas J. Handler, Op-Ed., A Stealthy Prenup Can Help Protect Assets, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/21/the-power-
of-the-prenup/a-stealthy-prenup-can-help-protect-assets?emc=etal, archived at 
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This Article argues that the dominant model of corporate law, according to 
which a firm is primarily a nexus of contracts, offers the basis for a coherent 
law of family business. The immediate benefit is to show how the parties’ 
expectations reflect all aspects of their mutual relationships. Further, a 
contractual perspective helps to catalogue an array of questions one would ask 
in developing default rules tailored to the needs of typical family businesses. 
Put differently, the open texture of contract provokes repeat players—scholars, 
lawyers, judges, legislators, and business owners—to define the elements of a 
workable family-business law.300 
Ultimately, the goal is to support the voluntary participation of family 
members in a shared venture by protecting their expectations. As is true of any 
closely held business, contracts in family businesses establish relationships 
rather than the terms of specific, bargained-for exchanges, and the parties 
cannot be expected to anticipate and adequately address all eventualities that 
may occur over time.301 For family businesses, relational aspects are 
particularly significant: the time horizon stretches across generations, objectives 
often include more than simple profit maximization, and business dealings 
involve emotional consequences for the participants that also need to be 
acknowledged.302 
Accordingly, family-business law should offer a resource—a set of 
principles that credit the parties’ negotiated bargain in full context that also 
compensate for what family members cannot anticipate or adequately address 
regarding their business venture. By drawing upon a rich inventory of 
experience, courts and legislatures can use the contractual conception of the 
firm to establish the foundation for a law of family business. 
 
                                                                                                                       
http://perma.cc/8LAV-TSNW (opining that, in light of the uncertainty as to whether a court 
will enforce a prenuptial agreement, wealthy individuals can achieve the same asset 
protection through a combination of business entity forms). Mr. Handler, who is a lawyer, 
created an alternative that he describes as follows: “It’s a carefully organized combination of 
three legal entities: a management company (L.L.C., S Corp. or C Corp.); a family limited 
liability company (F.L.L.C.); and an international asset protection trust. Each entity has 
distinct characteristics and benefits, and each is organized in a different jurisdiction.”  Id. 
For similar, if less cynical advice describing utility of multi-entity forms to shield family 
assets, see DRAKE, supra note 1, at 40. 
 300  Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Freedom of Contracts 19 (Tel Aviv Univ. Law 
Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 176), available at law.bepress.com/taulwps/art176 
(“[C]ontract law is not ‘merely passive’—it can influence the social practices it supports, 
reinforce and extend such practices, and make them more reliable . . . .”). 
 301  See Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. 
CORP. L. 377, 394 (1990). For further discussion of relational contracts in closely held 
businesses, see Means, A Contractual Approach, supra note 67, at 1195–1203. 
      302 Judicial monitoring remains important as a backstop to prevent opportunism and 
oppression when relationships falter and one party is in a position to exercise its power over 
another. See Thompson, supra note 301, at 394 (“A fully contingent contract cannot be 
drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts is used to support these [unstated] 
assumptions.”). 
       
